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A "CIVIL" METHOD OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ON THE
RESERVATION: IN REM FORFEITURE AND INDIAN

LAW
Henry S. Noyes*

Introduction
Indian tribes in the United States do not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. This jurisdictional limitation on Indian sovereignty is a serious
problem for Indian tribes because they cannot enforce their criminal laws
against non-Indians who commit crimes on Indian reservations. This article
proposes and assesses forfeiture as a method of law enforcement for Indian
tribes and concludes that enacting and enforcing forfeiture provisions would
broaden the limited array of law enforcement tools available to Indian tribes.
By using in rem forfeiture, a civil proceeding, tribes would avoid the problem
of asserting criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians while maintaining a
practical method of law enforcement.
L The Problem of Law Enforcement on Reservations
Indian tribes occupy a unique position in the American legal system. On
one hand, the United States recognizes that Indian tribes are sovereign entities
and the United States Congress has found that "there is a government-togovernment relationship between the United States and each Indian tribe."'
On the other hand, Indian tribes do not retain the full complement of powers
and liberties attendant to sovereignty. Congress has plenary power over the
Indian tribes and Congress can delegate or restrict the incidents of sovereignty
that the tribes may exercise. Indian tribes, therefore, are known as "domestic
dependent nations ' in Anglo-American law.
Congress has exercised its plenary power and limited Indian sovereignty
over criminal acts through passage of legislation such as the Major Crimes
Act3 and the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).4 The Major Crimes Act

*Associate, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutm, San Francisco, California. B.A., 1990, Northwestern
University; J.D., 1994, Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington. This article was written
in part while I was a law clerk for the Honorable Jesse E. Eschbach of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Patrick Baude and David Williams provided sparks of inspiration.
My first and last thanks go to Shana Connell Noyes, without whose patience and assistance this
article would not have been possible. I can be reached at noyes-hs@pillsburylaw.com.
1. 25 U.S.C. § 3601(1) (1994).
2. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
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mandates exclusive federal jurisdiction over several "major" crimes' when the
crime is perpetrated by an Indian in Indian country. The ICRA limits the
punishment that Indian tribal courts can impose on Indians who commit
crimes to a one-year imprisonment, a fine of $5000, or both.6
The Supreme Court also has limited Indian sovereignty within Indian
country. In 1978, the Supreme Court held that criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians is inconsistent with the Indians' status as domestic dependent nations
in Oliphantv Suquamish Indian Tribe.7 The Court decided that Indians gave
up a measure of their sovereignty when they "submitt[ed] to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States .... ." The cumulative effect of Oliphant
and these congressional acts has left a void in law enforcement on Indian
reservations. "Statutory and decisional laws have truly made Indian
reservations 'havens' for criminal offenders." 9
The National Congress of American Indians stated in a May 15, 1978,
letter to the President of the United States that the Oliphant decision "gives
non-Indians an open invitation to go onto the reservation and do anything they
please without fear of arrest or judicial reprisal."'" Professor David Wachtel
succinctly described the problem:
Neither state nor federal courts are empowered to enforce tribal
ordinances. Thus, if tribal courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over
a non-Indian offender, in many instances, he or she will be
immune from prosecution. In this case, the sole remedy of the
tribe will be to remove the offender from the reservation-a
measure which has not been demonstrated to have any significant
deterrent effect."
Professor Wachtel's and the National Congress of Indians' concern is not
merely academic; it is a real problem for Indian tribes. Non-Indians
increasingly traverse onto Indian reservations. Expanding tribal economies and
increased population near reservations continue to bring many non-Indians
into daily contact with Indians and their reservations. In 1986, for example,
more than 80,000 travellers crossed the Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian

5. The crimes that Congress currently considers "major" include murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping, maiming, rape and related offenses, incest, several types of assault, arson, burglary,
and robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
7. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
8. Id. at 210.
9. AMi.RICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 71
(1980) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY].

10. David Wachtel, Indian Law Enforcement, in INDIANS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 109

(Laurence French ed., 1982).
11. AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW at D-4
(Mary Beth West ed., 1976) [hereinafter MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW].
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Reservation every day on their way to Scottsdale, Tempe, and other Arizona
cities." Many tourists also entered the reservation to go boating on the Salt
River. This tribe faces problems that are common to many communities in
metropolitan locations, such as drug trafficking, littering, and skinny
dipping. 3 Due to the unique status of Indians in the Anglo-American legal
system, the tribe does not possess the power to punish the non-Indians who
violate the tribe's laws. Congress held hearings on delegating jurisdiction to
the tribes when non-Indians commit misdemeanor crimes on the reservation, 4
but ultimately decided not to take action.
During 1994, roughly 140,000 non-Indians visited the Mashantucket Pequot
reservation in Connecticut each week. The Pequots operate the Foxwood
Casino and employ 8350 employees, almost all of whom are non-Indians, and
none of whom are covered by state or federal labor laws. 5 The tribe has its
own court system, its own eighteen-member police force, and its own jail
system."6 What they do not have is criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
The challenge for the Pequots and for all tribes is to strengthen their
"authority, independence, and sovereignty"" by making and enforcing civil
laws.
The circumstances that exist on the Salt River Pima-Maricopa and the
Mashantucket Pequot Reservations are not unique. In fact, they are endemic
to reservations across the United States. Two of the greatest sustainable
resources currently available to tribes in their struggle to gain economic
independence are tourism and gambling, and both require the tribes to admit
large numbers of non-Indians onto the reservation. A dilemma arises because
non-Indians have a degree of immunity while on the reservation. The tribe is
powerless to prosecute non-Indian lawbreakers, and the state and federal
governments are averse to funding law enforcement for a "separate segment"
of society.
American Indian tribes must establish an effective method of administering
justice and enforcing tribal law without exercising criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Tribes must develop justice systems to deal with a range of

12. Administration of Justice Within the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Reservation:
Hearingon S. 2564 Before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986)
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 2564] (statement of Hazel Elbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs, Tribal Operations, Department of Interior).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Kirk Johnson, Pequot Indians' Casino Wealth Extends the Reach of Tribal Law, N.Y.
TIMs, May 22, 1994, at Al. For a discussion of the applicability of labor laws to Indian tribes,
see Vicki J. Limas, Application of Federal Laborand Employment Statutes to Native American
Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (1994).
16. Johnson, supra note 15, at Al.
17. Id.
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problems far broader than problems such as "litter" and "skinny dipping."'"
The Department of Interior's Inspector General has warned that the influx of
money and outside management from gaming operations leaves tribes
especially vulnerable to organized criminal activity. 9 Indeed, some Indian
casinos have failed in the midst of allegations of money-skimming, mob
infiltration, bribery, and murder.'
This article proposes and assesses one possible weapon in the Indians'
limited law enforcement arsenal. Civil forfeiture provisions modelled after the
federal code would be effective, legitimate, and useful tools in the struggle to
maintain law, order, and public safety on reservations. The federal
government has a broad array of civil forfeiture provisions available to assist
it in its law enforcement efforts. In 1989, the federal government seized and
forfeited over $600 million worth of assets, including currency, planes, boats,
and cattle. The state and federal governments, working together, have seized
more than $1 billion from drug-related offenders alone."' The federal statutes
tackle topics as broad as criminal enterprises involved in drug trafficking,
money laundering, and organized crime,' and as narrow as confiscation of
illegal roulette wheels.'
In rem forfeiture is an effective method of law enforcement. It is a civil
proceeding and, therefore, available to tribes. Tribes could forfeit the
instrumentalities and proceeds of many types of crime, including but not
limited to, gambling, drugs, environmental crime, and everyday civil
violations. Tribes also could enforce the regulations that protect the nature
and character of their reservations. For instance, tribes generally have only
one method of enforcing tribal hunting and fishing regulations against nonIndians: they have the right to exclude them from the reservation. Forfeiture
provisions would allow the tribe to seize and forfeit the property that is used
to violate hunting and fishing regulations. Forfeiture is a method of
enforcement that could be modelled after federal law and those laws that are
"typically used by states in enforcing fish and wildlife regulations."'

18. Hearingon S. 2564, supra note 12, at 8.
19. Report Urges Controls on Indian Gaming Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993, at A37.
20. Paul Lieberman, Lady Luck Turns on Indians, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at Al.
21. Mary M. Cheh, ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve CriminalLaw
Objectives: Understandingand Transcending the Criminal-CivilLaw Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1327 (1991).
22. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994); see also CRIMINAL DIV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A
MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (2d ed. 1988).
23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1172, 1173(a)(3), 1177 (1994).
24. Veronica L. Bowen, The Extent of Indian Regulatory Authority Over Non.Indians: South
Dakota v. Bourland, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 605, 653 (1994).
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Modelling tribal forfeiture laws after the federal laws is especially
interesting and important because tribal forfeiture laws would appeal both to
self-determinationists and to assimilationists. Self-determinationists seek to
foster tribal sovereignty. Enacting and enforcing tribal forfeiture laws would
enhance Indian sovereignty, strengthen the powers of tribal governments, and
increase the importance of tribal justice systems - all of which are goals of
Indian tribes, Congress, and the federal governmentf - and would develop
simultaneously an effective method of law enforcement. Assimilationists
encourage Indian tribes to adopt the federal government's institutions.
Modelling tribal forfeiture laws after federal forfeiture laws would allow
Indian tribes to utilize the Anglo-American institution for their own purposes.
This combination is particularly intriguing because forfeiture is an
institution that suffers from as much criticism as it enjoys praise. Forfeiture
effectively turns the phrase "innocent until proven guilty" on its head; it forces
people to prove their innocence or be deprived of their property. Tribes who
adopt forfeiture provisions would put the assimilationists' feet to the fire of
the federal code. By adopting the Anglo-American legal institution of civil
forfeiture for their own purposes, the Indian tribes would tell the
assimilationists, "Be careful what you ask for - you just might get it."
II. A Primeron Forfeiture
A. The Basics
In rem forfeiture is a legal process whereby the sovereign brings a civil
action to acquire property that is connected to a crime, employed in a manner
that is proscribed by the sovereign, or is of a certain nature, regardless of its
use.26 The theory underlying and supporting in rem forfeiture is a legal
fiction that allows state and federal courts to obtain jurisdiction over property
in circumstances where the courts might otherwise lack jurisdiction over the
owner.27 "In rem forfeiture, that is, forfeiture of the thing, grew from the
ancient notion that an instrument of harm is itself culpable, and must provide
expiation for the injury."' A conviction is not a prerequisite to a forfeiture

25. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994). See infra part IV.B.2 (discussing the Indian Tribal
Justice Act).
26. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994). For an extensive discussion of the history of forfeiture
in American law, see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), and see
also Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
27. See e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
28. United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing
OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW ch. 1 (1881) and Exodus 21:28); see also United States
v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971) ("Traditionally forfeiture actions
have proceeded upon the fiction that inanimate objects themselves can be guilty of wrongdoing.");
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,
253 U.S. 505, 511 (1921).
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proceeding because the guilt or innocence of the "owner" of the property is
immateial. "9 In rem forfeiture law allows the sovereign to forfeit property,

even if the sovereign has not defined the relevant activity as "criminal.""0
Forfeiture is often an alternative to the criminal justice system, and it may be
used as a method of regulatory enforcement."
In a civil forfeiture proceeding, the government seizes property and brings
an action to perfect the government's title to the forfeited property.32 The
property already belongs to the government because title to the property vests
in the government at the time of the unlawful act,33 under the legal fiction
of the "relation back doctrine."' In United States v. Stowell, the Supreme
Court stated:
By the settled doctrine of this court, whenever a statute enacts
that upon the commission of a certain act specific property used

in connection with that act shall be forfeited, the forfeiture takes
effect immediately upon the commission of the act; the right to
the property then vests in the United States, although their title is

not perfected until judicial condemnation; the forfeiture constitutes
a statutory transfer of the right to the United States at the time the

The history of forfeiture dates to biblical times. In Exodus it is written: "If an
ox gore a man or woman and they die, then the ox shall be stoned and his flesh
no eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit [freed of further obligation]."
(Exod. 21:28.) This is a perfect forfeiture. The ox violated the law and the owner's
guilt can not .be proven. Therefore, the ox is taken, and the owner is denied the
right to eat ox steaks, thereby losing his property right entirely.
Michael F. Zeldin & Robert C. Weiner, Innocent Third Parties and Their Rights in Federal
ForfeitureProceedings,28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 843, 843 (1991).
29. See Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 683 ("[T]he innocence of the owner of property subject
to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense."); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) a: 6 ("[Ihe practice has been, and so this Court understands the law to be, that the
proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in
personarn."); see also David J. Taube, Civil Forfeiture,30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1025, 1026 (1993).
But see United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2151 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Distinguishing between in rem and in personam punishments does not depend upon, or revive,
the fiction ... that the property is punished as if it were a sentient being capable of moral choice,
It is the owner who feels the pain and receives the stigma of forfeiture, not the property."
(citations omitted)).
The Supreme Court has reserved ruling on the issue whether the government may forfeit the
property of a truly innocent owner. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
30. Cheh, supra note 21, at 1339.
31. hd.at 1340 & n.75 (citing David Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 381 (1988)).
-32. See generally U.S. DEP~t OF JusncE, AssET FORFEITURE: LAW, PRAcTIcE, AND POLICY
(1989).
33. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
34. For examples of federal codification of the relation back doctrine, see 18 U.S.C. § 981 (f)
(1994) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1994).
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offense is committed; and the condemnation, when obtained,
relates back to that time, and avoids all intermediate sales and
alienations, even to purchasers in good faith. 5
There are three basic categories of forfeiture: "contraband,"
"instrumentalities," and "proceeds."36 Contraband is property that is itself
"guilty" because the sovereign has prohibited its importation, exportation, or
possession." One method the federal government uses to enforce custom and
import laws is to forfeit contraband. 8 Instrumentalities include property
"connected" to illicit activity. Instrumentalities may be used, for example, in
producing, storing, transporting, or distributing contraband. 39 Proceeds from
illegal activity are also subject to forfeiture. "This category includes the profit
from a business fraudulently obtained, as well as any enterprise or goods in
which money from criminal activities has been invested."'
The fact that the proceeding is an in rem civil proceeding significantly
affects the rights and defenses available to a claimant to the property.4 The
full range of constitutional protections available in a criminal prosecution does
not necessarily apply in a civil action, such as a civil forfeiture.42 The United
States Constitution distinguishes between civil and criminal cases, and the

35. Stowell, 133 U.S. at 16-17.
36. The discussion of categories and rationales for forfeiture is taken from Cheh, supra note
21, at 1340-42.
37. See Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Contraband per
se consists of objects which are 'intrinsically illegal in character,' 'the possession of which,
without more, constitutes a crime."' (citations omitted)). Because it is not subject to legal
possession, there is no "property right" in contraband. Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305. "Derivative
contraband" includes items that "become unlawful because of the use to which they are put." Id.
38. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1595a, 1703 (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994); 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-784
(1994).
39. Congress has even enacted provisions that permit forfeiture of leasehold interests as
instrumentalities in narcotics crimes. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994) (as amended by the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181).
40. Cheh, supranote 21, at 1341 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994)).
41. See generally Cheh, supra note 21; J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and
Forfeitures: A Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 M!NN. L. REv. 379 (1976).
42. Taube, supra note 29, at 1044 & n.221. See generally David J. Stone, Note, The
Opportunity of Austin v. United States: Toward a FunctionalApproach to Civil Forfeiture and
the Eighth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REv. 427, 430-37 (1993). Professor Cheh believes that the
reason civil forfeiture is so popular with law enforcement is because of the relaxed procedures
required in an in rem forfeiture.
Police and prosecutors have embraced civil strategies not only because they
expand the arsenal of weapons available to reach antisocial behavior, but also
because officials believe that civil remedies offer speedy solutions that are
unencumbered by the rigorous constitutional protections associated with criminal
trials, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, trial by jury, and appointment of
counsel.
Cheh, supra note 21, at 1329.
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Supreme Court recently noted this difference in United States v. Ursery.3
The Fiflh Amendment's proscription against self-incrimination explicitly
applies to "criminal cases.' The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the
"accused" the rights to a speedy trial, a trial by jury, confrontation of
witnesses, and assistance of counsel in "all criminal prosecutions."45 The
Supreme Court has limited other guarantees, such as the requirement that guilt
be established beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions, even
though the Constitution does not expressly limit (or grant) these rights.'
When enacting forfeiture laws, Congress recognized and capitalized on the
importance of the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings. In a
federal in rem forfeiture, the government may seize property without filing
charges or obtaining a conviction, and the owner (who becomes a "claimant")
is not entitled to a presumption of innocence. The government merely must
establish probable cause that the seized property was associated with or
involved in illicit activity.47 Once the government has established probable
cause, the claimant bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture." The claimant may do
so by disproving probable cause49 or by establishing innocent ownership of
the property.'
B. Building the ForfeitureHouse on a Foundationof Legal Fictions
The most striking feature of in rem forfeiture is that the entire area of law
is premised upon the legal fiction that "the thing is primarily considered the
offender .... ."' Anglo-American law declares that a property is itself
"guilty." Forfeiture law has given rise to several other legal fictions. For
instance, the relation back doctrine is a legal fiction whereby the government
merely perfects its already existing title to the "thing." This type of logic -

43. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1993). For a more complete discussion of Urseryand related cases, see
infra part VIII.
44. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
45. Id. at amend. VI (emphasis added).
46. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).

47. United States v. 1987 Jeep Wrangler, 972 F.2d 472, 476 (2d Cir. 1992). For an example
of a federal statute stating that the standard is probable cause, see 19 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994).
48. Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. 197, 211 (1845) (stating that the judge determines
whether there is probable cause and, if so, the burden shifts to the claimant); e.g., 21 U.S.C. §
881(b)(4); Peter Petrou, Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the Burden of Proof in
Forfeiture Proceedings Arising Out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DUKE L.J. 822, 825
(1984).
49. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 893 F.2d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 1990).
50. United States v. One Afghan Urial Ovis Orientalis Blanfordi Fully Mounted Sheep, 964
F.2d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 1992).
51. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921). "[C]ivil forfeiture is
a creature unto itself. It is an area of the law which is founded upon the many inherent fictions
of our jurisprudence." 1987 Jeep Wrangler, 972 F.2d at 476.
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legal fiction built upon legal fiction - can lead to some shocking results. For
instance, in the spirit of President Ronald Reagan's "Zero Tolerance" policy,
the Coast Guard seized the Atlantis II - one of the nation's premier research
ships, belonging to the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution - based on the
presence of marijuana residue and two pipes in the crew's quarters.' Legal
fiction arguably should not support the weight of such a result.
On the other hand, there is a long historical tradition supporting the legal
fiction that property itself may be guilty. This legal fiction is well developed
in American jurisprudence through a "venerable history in our case law."'
One might argue that history and case law should not prevent courts from
requiring Congress to build in rem forfeiture law on a firmer foundation.
However, it appears that the law has developed beyond that point because
Congress has enacted over 100 forfeiture statutes, creating a huge body of law
that exploits the legal fictions underlying forfeiture law.' Congress in the
future may change the law, but the legal fiction that property is guilty will
remain the foundation of in rem forfeitures.
In rem forfeiture rests on a legal fiction derived out of sheer judicial
necessity. The Supreme Court has recognized that without in rem jurisdiction,
state and federal courts in many cases would be powerless because they lack
in personam jurisdiction over the owner of the guilty "thing."' "The fictions
of in rem forfeiture were developed primarily to expand the reach of the

52. Jane Fritsch, U.S. to Drop Drug Case Against Research Vessel, L.A. TIMES, July 26,
1988 (government chose not to pursue forfeiture only after public outcry); see also United States
v. One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1989) (basing forfeiture of Mercedes on
possession of "personal use" amount of cocaine); United States v. 5528 Belle Pond Drive, 783
F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Va. 1991) (discussing reported cases of forfeiture of large amount of property
based on small amount of marijuana), affid sub nom. United States v. Campbell, 979 F.2d 849
(4th Cir. 1992).
53. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993) (footnote omitted).
54. Lawrence A. Kasten, Note, Extending ConstitutionalProtectionto Civil Forfeituresthat
Exceed Rough Remedial Compensation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 194, 194 (1991). Many states
have adopted civil forfeiture statutes. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 5320 (West Supp. 1995)
(forfeiture of property for lending institution law violations); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11470 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (forfeiture of property for drug law violations); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. § 1310 (McKinney Supp. 1991) (forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities of
crime); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 480.05 (McKinney 1994) (forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities
of drug law violations). Concerns regarding protections for innocent citizens and abuse of
forfeiture law by law enforcement agencies may have prevented the approval of a "uniform" or
"model" forfeiture law. Mary Pat Flaherty, There's No Justice Dept. At Talks On Property
Seizures: Groups Feud Over Protectionsfor Innocent Citizens, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 20, 1991,
at A13 (discussing drafting efforts by National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State

Laws).
55. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
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courts ... "' and the courts employ legal fictions to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements in cases utilizing in rem forfeitures."1
This article does not make inquiry into the propriety of the legal fictions
upon which in rem forfeiture is premised. The preceding discussion simply
presents the existing theory of jurisdiction in such cases. This article argues
that tribal courts may exercise civil jurisdiction in civil forfeiture proceedings
over property located on Indian land and should do so. The legal fictions
necessary to support federal in rem forfeiture law also support the tribes'
enactment and enforcement of in rem forfeiture provisions. Tribes do not
possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, but tribes could pursue in rem
proceedings when a non-Indian claimed the "thing" (property) in question.
The legal fiction that the government brings suit under a civil statute would
circumvent the problem of criminal jurisdiction, because the matter is a civil
proceeding. The legal fiction that the government proceeds against the
property, not the person, also would circumvent the problem of tribal court
jurisdiction over non-Indians, because property does not possess, by itself, a
racial character. Even assuming that property could be categorized as either
Indian or non-Indian, ihe relation back doctrine would make the property in
question "tribal" property. Non-Indian owners would be mere "claimants" and
the judicial proceeding would merely perfect the tribe's title to the property.
Tribal governments and courts should use the legal fiction foundation, upon
which Anglo-American law has built in rem forfeiture, to extend their power
in a limited sense over non-Indians. After all, the Supreme Court states that
"[tihe fictions of in rem forfeiture were developed primarily to expand the
reach of the courts . . . ."" The fact that tribal courts might utilize these
fictions concurrently with the federal courts should not be cause for concern.
Federal policy encourages tribes to revitalize their self-government and to
develop tribal courts and justice systems. By employing legal fictions that
have a long historical tradition in Anglo-American law, tribal courts would
reproduce and mirror the experience of Anglo-American jurisprudence. What
is good for the goose is good for the gander.

56. Republic National Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80,87 (1992). The exercise
of in rem jurisdiction is necessary because it is often "the only adequate means of suppressing
the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party." United States v. Brig Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844).

57. The use of in rem forfeiture predates the establishment of constitutional government.
"Long before the adoption of the Constitution the Common Law Courts in the Colonies - and
later in the States during the period of the Confederation - were exercising in rem jurisdiction
in the enforcement of (English and Local) forfeiture statutes." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
58. Republic National Bank of Miami, 506 U.S. at 87.
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III. Oliphant and the Civil/CriminalJurisdictional
Dichotomy in Federal Indian Law
The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he distinction between a civil penalty
and a criminal penalty is of some constitutional import."59 Nowhere is this
distinction more important than in federal Indian law.
In 1978, the Supreme Court held that Indian tribal courts, "absent
affirmative delegation of such power by Congress," do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.' The Court did not rely on a treaty or a
congressional enactment in limiting Indian sovereignty. Instead, the Court
stated that such power was inconsistent with the Indians' status as domestic
dependent nations. 6' The Court reasoned that Indian tribes necessarily lost
some degree of sovereignty when they "submitt[ed] to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States .. . ."62 One lost incident of sovereignty
was the power to try non-Indians in criminal proceedings. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Oliphant went further and stated that the Indians' "limitation upon
their sovereignty amounts to the right of governing every person within their
limits except themselves."' Read literally, Justice Rehnquist's statement
would preclude Indians from exercising civil or criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians. All that would remain of Indian sovereignty would be the power to
govern entirely internal matters.
Fortunately, subsequent decisions limited Justice Rehnquist's pronouncement regarding the extent of Indian sovereignty. The Supreme Court has
not extended its opinion in Oliphant to preclude Indians from exercising civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations. In the same year that
Oliphant was decided, the Supreme Court recognized tribal law-making
institutions as competent legislatures,' and recognized tribal courts "as
appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting
important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians."'
It is clear that the tribes have some power to exercise jurisdiction over nonIndians, but the Supreme Court continues to define the boundaries of that
power.

59. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (evaluating statutory fines and
penalties).
60. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978).
61. Id. at 208.
62. l. at 210. As with the statement of forfeiture law, this Article does not take issue with
the state of federal Indian Law, it simply acts upon it.
63. Id. at 209 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810) (emphasis
added)).
64. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 (1978).
65. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 65 (footnote and citation omitted); see also Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs.' Congress may take
jurisdiction over any matter by an express reduction of Indian sovereignty,
even matters involving crimes among Indians, as it did in the Major Crimes
Act.' Alternatively, Congress may expressly delegate jurisdiction to tribes,
including jurisdiction over non-Indians." Where Congress neither expressly
retains jurisdiction nor delegates sovereignty, the Supreme Court analyzes the
character of the asserted aspect of sovereignty, as it did in Oliphant. "In sum,
Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty
'
or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status."69
In 1981, three years after Oliphant,the Supreme Court elaborated on the
remaining confines of Indian sovereignty. In Montana v. United States," the
Supreme Court held that the Crow Indian Tribe had no power to regulate
fishing and hunting by non-Indians on reservation land owned in fee by nonIndians.7 The Court stated that "the principles on which [Oliphant] relied
support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."'
The Court, however, also stated that Indian tribes retain sovereign power to
exercise "some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations ... ."' The Court then listed two such forms: first, Indian tribes
retain inherent power to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians "when that
conduct lhreatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."' Second, Indian
tribes "may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing; contracts, leases, or other arran'
gements."75
The Court concluded its opinion by listing a different but related
power that the tribe retained: the right of Indians to exclude non-Indians from
Indian lands.76
The Supreme Court analysis suggested by the court in Montana was the
subject of two recent Supreme Court decisions, Brendale v. Confederated

66. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
67. 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (holding that Congress validly
delegated authority to tribes to regulate the introduction of liquor into Indian country in 18 U.S.C.

§ 1161).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

United Sates v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Id. at 545.
Id. at 565.
Id.

74. Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
75. ld. at 565 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 554, 558, 566-67; see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 690 (1993)
(citing Montana for the proposition that the treaty right to "absolute and undisturbed use"
encompasses the right to exclude and to regulate).
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Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian NationO and South Dakota v. Bourland 8
In both decisions, the Court - with a few modifications - relied on the
Montana analysis. Since Montana remains as the vital inquiry, the next
section of the article applies the Montana analysis to determine whether tribes
have civil jurisdiction in a forfeiture proceeding, Parts V and VI discuss the
two subsequent Supreme Court decisions that explicate Montana.
IV. Reconciling Forfeiture Law with Federal Indian Law: The Montana
Analysis of Civil Jurisdiction
Reconciling forfeiture law with federal Indian law is primarily a matter of
analyzing the remaining aspects of Indian sovereignty to determine whether
the tribal court7 " has jurisdiction. Oliphant and Montana establish the
framework for an analysis of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Montana provides that a tribe has civil jurisdiction over the activities of
non-Indians in four situations: First, Congress may expressly delegate
jurisdiction to the tribe. Second, if Congress has not delegated jurisdiction and
has not expressly reduced tribal jurisdiction, a tribe has jurisdiction over the
activities of non-Indians when the activities threaten or have some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe. Third, absent express congressional delegation or reduction, tribes
retain jurisdiction over the activities on non-Indians who enter consensual
relationships with a tribe or its members. Fourth, and finally, unless Congress
has diminished the power, tribes retain the right to exclude non-Indians from
Indian tribal lands.
A. Does Montana Apply to Civil Forfeiture?
Before beginning this analysis it is necessary to consider whether these
cases that concern jurisdiction over non-Indians are relevant to in rem
forfeitures. If not, Indian jurisdiction over an in rem forfeiture proceeding is
appropriate. The Montana analysis might not apply to civil forfeiture because
it is an in rem proceeding. Civil forfeiture is an action against property, not
against an Indian or a non-Indian. Under the relation-back doctrine, "the
forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the [specified]

77. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
78. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).

79. There are three basic types of Indian judicial systems: (1)tribal courts which are
established by tribal constitution, code, or ordinance; (2) traditional or custom courts which
exercise authority in accordance with longstanding oral customs; and (3) Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) courts which are established pursuant to provisions of the Code of Federal
Regulations. AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION
AND THE ROLE OF TRIBAL COURTS, in Tribal Courts Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the
Senate Select Committee on IndianAffairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1992). Because this article
discusses statutorily adopted forfeiture provisions, the discussion of tribal courts refers to the first
listed type of Indian judicial system.
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act. . . " The action brought by the tribe merely perfects the tribe's
property interest as sovereign. The action is therefore an entirely internal
tribal matter. The Supreme Court has held that tribes retain power over
internal matters and the right to self government.8' One federal court has
written that "[tihe regulation of tribal property would seem to be one of the
vestiges of tribal sovereignty and thus a matter of self government." 2
The legal fiction of a "guilty" property - unrelated to the owner's
innocence - would satisfy even Justice Rehnquist's broad statement in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe83 that by submitting to the sovereignty
of the United States, the Indians gave up "the right of governing every person
within their limit except themselves."' Tribal jurisdiction in such cases
would extend only to property. The exercise ofjurisdiction over property does
not approach the governance of non-Indian people that so concerned the
Oliphant Court. Furthermore, it is consistent with the Indians' "dependent
status."
Congress has recognized and heightened the importance of distinguishing
between jurisdiction over a person and jurisdiction over property. In enacting
the ICRA, Congress guaranteed certain rights to all parties who appear
before tribal courts. These rights are similar to the rights in the Bill of Rights.
Congress chose, however, to provide for federal review of ICRA violations
only in habeas corpus cases; cases in which the petitioner rather than the
property is being held in custody.' Consequently, "[tihat means that tribal
courts are the sole arbiters of their own governmental actions when 'mere'
property rights of non-Indians are involved.""7 Congress has given Indian
tribes greater power over cases dealing with property.
The Supreme Court recognized the importance of distinguishing between
in personam jurisdiction and in rem jurisdiction in a recent case. In County
of Yakima. v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,"8
the Court upheld a state ad valorem property tax on land that was within the
Yakima Indian Reservation and owned by reservation Indians. The Court
stated that "[w]hile the in personam jurisdiction over reservation Indians at

80. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1889).
81. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832).
82. Cowan v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 404 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (D.S.D. 1975).
83. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
84. Id. at 209 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810)).
85. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1312 (1994).
86. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
87. Veronica L. Bowen, The Extent of Indian Regulatory Authority Over Non-Indians:South
Dakota v. Bourland, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 605, 650 (1994) (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 69-70,
72); see also FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 668 (Rennard Strickland et
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN 1982 ED.] (stating that ICRA limits federal court review to
petitions for writs of habeas corpus).
88. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
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issue in Moe [v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribessl would have been
significantly disruptive of tribal self-government, the mere power to assess
and collect a tax on certain real estate is not."' If a state's exercise of in rem
jurisdiction does not disrupt tribal self-government because it affects the
property alone, then the tribal exercise of in rem jurisdiction within the
boundaries of the reservation should not infringe on state or federal
sovereignty. This exercise of tribal sovereignty will not result in "unwarranted
intrusions" on non-Indians' personal liberty in contravention of basic principles
of Anglo-American justice - like the Bill of Rights - that the Court feared
in Oliphant.9
The fact that in rem proceedings are based on a legal fiction should not
raise substantial concerns. The Supreme Court has long recognized that in
rem forfeiture was created out of necessity to expand the jurisdiction of
federal courts.92 For example, in rem procedures are particularly useful and
in fact necessary to admiralty proceedings in which courts might otherwise
lack in personam jurisdiction over the owner of the property.93 Similarly, the
use of in rem procedures by tribes would expand the reach of tribal courts and
allow tribes to exert some control over non-Indians in civil matters. Both
federal and tribal courts would obtain jurisdiction over matters in which they
otherwise "might have lacked in personam jurisdiction over the owner of the
property."" More importantly, this exercise of civil jurisdiction would not
violate Oliphant because the tribes would not be exercising criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.

B. CongressionalAction
There are over 100 federal statutes containing forfeiture provisions. The
express language of the statutes neither delegates to tribes the authority to
enact their own forfeiture laws nor precludes them from enacting their own
forfeiture laws. This part of the article examines various congressional actions
that could be construed as delegating or precluding tribal jurisdiction.

89. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
90. County of Yakinai, 502 U.S. at 265; see also United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,
2140 (1996) (citing Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581
(1931)) (noting the "sharp distinction between in rem civil forfeitures and in personam civil
penalties such as fines: Though the latter could, in some circumstances, be punitive, the former
could not").
91. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) ("By submitting to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian Tribes therefore necessarily give up their
power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to
Congress.").
92. Republic National Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87 (1992).
93. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 616 n.9 (1993) (citing United States v. Brig
Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844)).
94. Id. at 2808.
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1. CongressionalAction PrecludingTribal Jurisdiction
A number of federal forfeiture statutes take effect upon the occurrence of
illegal activity on Indian country.9s For example, federal law provides for the
forfeiture to the United States of any fish and wildlife taken in violation of
tribal ordinances, and for the forfeiture of the vehicles and/or equipment used
to take the fish or wildlife.' The Secretary may authorize tribal personnel
to enforce these provisions." The enactment of federal laws like these should
not preclude tribes from enacting civil forfeiture laws in other areas because
jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians is a vital part of tribal
sovereignty and Congress "has never expressed any intent to limit the civil

jurisdiction of the tribal courts.' 98 In fact, state forfeiture laws coexist with
federal forfeiture laws in the same way that tribal forfeiture laws might
coexist with federal forfeiture laws."
Because state and federal forfeiture laws coexist, the Supreme Court has
had to establish a rule of priority in the exercise of in rem jurisdiction. When
two courts, one state and one federal, each claim in rem jurisdiction over the
same res, "the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property may
8
maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.""t
Tribal courts, therefore, should have in rem jurisdiction over property located
within a reservation to the exclusion of a state court and a federal court'
when there is no preempting federal law. Even when there is a federal statute,

it is possible that the tribe may retain in rem jurisdiction unless the federal
government acts."~ In some cases, the government may choose not to act
in hopes or with the understanding that tribes will act.
One potential limit on the exercise of tribal sovereignty is the ICRA.0

3

95. See 25 U.S.C. § 264 (1994). That statute is discussed in U.S. ex rel. Hornell v. One
1976 Chevrolet Station Wagon, 585 F.2d 978, 981 (10th Cir. 1978).
96. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1994); see also Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (1994)
(regulating gaming-related machinery and technology), The Act authorizes seizure and forfeiture
in Indian country. Id. § 1177.
97. 16 U.S.C. § 3375(a)-(b) (1994).
98. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987).
99. For example, 16 U.S.C. § 3374(a)(2) (1994) authorizes forfeiture of fish or wildlife
taken in violation of state law. This does not preclude states from adopting their own forfeiture
laws.
100. Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935); see also United
States v. $79,123.49, 830 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1987). For a discussion of federal judicial
oversight of the tribal courts and the doctrine of abstention, see infra part VIII.A.
101. The- tribal court, in such case, should even be able to enjoin proceedings in the other
courts if it was the first court to assume jurisdiction over the res. See Princess Lida of Thum &
Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939); $79,123.49, 830 F.2d at 97 n.3.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 364 F.
Supp. 192, 195 (D. Mont. 1973) (stating that whatever in rem jurisdiction the tribe may have had
over the mechanical gambling devices found on the reservation prior to seizure by the federal
government, ceased to exist after the seizure); MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at D-4,
103. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994). For a general discussion of the ICRA, see DAVID H.
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The ICRA guarantees certain rights to all parties, Indians and non-Indians,
who appear before tribal courts. The provisions of the ICRA mirror some, but
not all, of the constitutional restraints on the states and the federal
government." One provision of the ICRA appears particularly limiting.
Title 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) limits tribal jurisdiction to maximum sentences of
one year in prison or a $5000 fine. The text of this provision, however, limits
its application to criminal offenses:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall....

(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict

cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event impose for
conviction of any offense any penalty or punishment greater than
imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or
both .. .o.

The unique nature of civil forfeiture should allow tribal courts to retain
jurisdiction.
The other provisions of the ICRA, the requirement of due process"° for
example, do not preclude tribal jurisdiction. At most, this section of the ICRA
simply governs tribal courts' exercise of jurisdiction in the same manner that
the U.S. Constitution restricts federal forfeitures."m The statutory and
common law experience of Anglo-America provides a developed model that
will assist the creation and enforcement of tribal forfeiture laws.
2. CongressionalDelegation of Jurisdiction
Just as Congress has not prohibited Indian tribes' enactment of civil
forfeiture provisions, Congress has not delegated to Indian tribes the specific
power to adopt civil forfeiture provisions. A specific delegation is not
necessary, however, for two reasons. First, Congress may believe that tribes
already possess the power to enact and enforce forfeiture provisions. Second,
Congress has expressed an affirmation of tribal court power over civil matters
that is so general that it should include this lesser, specific power.
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,"'5 the Court cited the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) as a statute
in which Congress recognized an extension of tribal sovereignty over non-

GETCHES Er AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 499-503 (3d ed. 1993).
104. GETCHES Er AL., supra note 103, at 499.
105. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994) (emphasis added).
106. Id. § 1302(8).
107. See infra part VIII.B (discussing the interaction between the constitutional limits on
forfeiture and the limits imposed by the ICRA). David Getches, Charles Wilkinson, and Robert
Williams argue that the ICRA may be less restrictive than the Constitution - the ICRA may not
incorporate all federal case law under the similarly worded constitutional provisions. GETCHEs
ET AL., supra note 103, at 501.
108. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
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Indians. The Court upheld a tribe's imposition of taxes on cigarettes
purchased by non-Indians. The Court wrote that the power to tax transactions
that occur on trust lands and significantly affect a tribe or its members "is a
fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of
it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status."'" The
Court found that neither federal law nor the tribes' dependent status divested
Indian taxing power.
[A]uthority to tax the activities orproperty of non-Indians taking
place or situated on Indian lands, in cases where the tribe has a
significant interest in the subject matter, was very probably one
of the tribalpowers under "existing law" confirmed by § 16 of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 476. In these
respects the present cases differ sharply from Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), in which we stressed
the shared assumptions of the Executive, Judicial and Legislative
Departments that Indian tribes could not exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians."'
If the tribes already possess the power, then Congress would not need to
delegate power in civil matters. Section 16 of the IRA is an example of a
tribal power confirmed by Congress, not an instance of congressional
delegation of power. Thus, an examination of jurisdiction in tribal forfeitures
necessitates an examination of Congress's understanding of tribal powers.
The Supreme Court has "repeatedly recognized the federal government's
longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-government. ' . The Court has
cited several federal statutes that are intended to effectuate this policy." 2
The Court has also noted the congressional policy of encouraging the
development of tribal courts."3 "Not satisfied solely with centralized
government of Indians, [Congress] encouraged tribal governments and courts

109. Id.at 152.
110. Id. at 153 (emphases added).
111. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (citing Three Affiliated Tribes
v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138
n.5 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 & n.10 (1980);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959)).
112. In Iowa Mutual, the court cited provisions from the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450(a) (1994), the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 476-479 (1994), and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994). Iowa
Mutual, 480 U.S. at 14 n.5. The Court has noted that § 16 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 476, is "a
statute specifically intended to encourage Indian tribes to revitalize their self-government." Fisher
v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 383 (1976) (per curiam).
113. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 14-15 & n.6 ("For example, Title II of the Indian Civil Rights
Act provide.,; 'for the establishing of educational classes for the training of judges of courts of
Indian offenses."' (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1311(4))),
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to become stronger and more highly organized."' 4 In 1993, Congress
enacted the Indian Tribal Justice Act 5 which seeks to assist and encourage
the development of tribal justice systems in general, and tribal courts in
particular.
An analysis of the propriety of forfeiture provisions must begin with the
presumption that the exercise of tribal jurisdiction is appropriate on Indian
land located within a reservation. Congress proceeds upon this assumption as
evidenced in the Indian Tribal Justice Act.
In 1987, the Supreme Court stated: "Tribal authority over the activities of
non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.
Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts
unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal
statute.""' 6 In the legislative history accompanying the Indian Tribal Justice
Act, Congress cites this Supreme Court language affirmatively and also states:
As for non-criminal jurisdiction, Indian tribes have the inherent
right to exercise civil jurisdiction within the territory it controls.
Tribes exercise a broad range of civil jurisdiction over the
activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which the
tribes have a significant interest."'
Not only did Congress recount the current state of the law (that an important
and vital aspect of tribal sovereignty is authority over the activities of nonIndians in Indian country),"' Congress also made specific findings regarding
the extent of tribal jurisdiction and included them in the Indian Tribal Justice
Act.
The Congress finds and declares that(5) tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal
governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public
health and safety and the political integrity of tribal governments;
(6) Congress arid the Federal courts have repeatedly recognized tribal justice systems as the appropriateforums for the
adjudication of disputes affecting personal and property rights;

114. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted).
115. Pub.L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994)).
116. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
117. H.R. REP. No. 205, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2425.
118. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19; see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66
(1981); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-89 (1976) (per curiam); COHEN 1982 ED.,
supra note 87, at 359 ("Tribal self-government requires that tribal authority over Indian property
on a reservation must be exclusive of state authority."). Tribal courts are, furthermore, the
"appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 65 (1978). (emphasis added).
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(7) traditional tribal justice practices are essential to the
maintenance of the culture and identity of Indian tribes and to the
goals of this Act .
1.9
The Report to accompany Senate Bill 521, explained that:
Finding (5) was added to reflect the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981), with regard to the authority of Indian tribal
governments to provide for the protection of the health and safety
of reservation residents and the political integrity of the tribe.
From all of the testimony presented to the Committee, it is clear
that tribal justice systems are an integral part of the efforts of
Indian tribal governments to exercise that authority.
Finding (6) was added to emphasize that tribal courts are
permanent institutions charged with resolving the rights and
interestsof both Indian and non-Indian individuals. The language
tracks similar language of the Supreme Court in its ruling in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), where the
Court stated that "tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as
appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes
affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians
and non-Indians, Id. at 65."'1
In maling these findings, Congress either delegated broad general power
over civil matters to the tribes or, more likely, Congress explicitly confirmed
its belief that civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians presumptively
lies in the tribal courts. Thus, although the Supreme Court has perverted the
presumption that civil jurisdiction remains with the tribal courts into a
presumption that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians,"'
Congress's actions dictate that federal courts must presume that the tribes
possess jurisdiction in civil matters.
In enacting the Indian Tribal Justice Act, Congress made specific findings
that memorialize a line of Supreme Court decisions that presume that tribes
retain civil jurisdiction over persons and property within the reservation.
Congress's findings require the federal courts to reexamine assertions of tribal
jurisdiction - such as the one proposed in this article - against a
presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction and to reject the Supreme Court's

119. 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994) (emphasis added).
120. S.REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1stSess. 8 (1993) (explanation of Committee Amendments
to the Tribal Justice Systems Act) (emphasis added).
121. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 690-91 (1993). For a discussion of how the
Court's decisions have perverted this presumption, see Justice Blackmun's opinion in Brendale
v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 448-68 (1989)
(Blackmun. J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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narrow vision of tribal power; to do so is to honor Congress's intentions and
assumptions. Given a choice between honoring the Supreme Court's vision of
tribal sovereignty and Congress's vision of tribal sovereignty, federal courts
must accept the vision of the elected legislature, not the judicial legislature.
This presumption in favor of civil jurisdiction, along with Congress's
general policy of approving and encouraging the strengthening of tribal
government, weighs heavily in favor of tribal jurisdiction in forfeitures. When
tribal actions mirror the federal government's actions, a stronger presumption
should exist that such acts are proper, and a federal court should affirm a
tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction. Congress has indicated a clear intention
that tribal courts presumptively have jurisdiction over activities of Indians and
non-Indians occurring on the reservation, and civil proceedings are sufficiently
distinct from criminal proceedings. If Congress believes this exercise of tribal
jurisdiction is excessive, then Congress may use its plenary power and
preclude the tribe from exerting jurisdiction. Federal courts should not act as
the administrators or watchdogs of tribal justice in the area of forfeiture. The
proper inference that federal courts should draw from the federal government's
silence is that tribal sovereignty remains intact." The remedy for any such
abuse lies with Congress." As one court stated:
The court recognizes that its conclusion - namely, that it is
without jurisdiction to hear reservation-based tort claims such as
Superior's - will relegate non-Indian plaintiffs like Superior to
what they may perceive as a hostile forum. This court cannot
presume, however, that non-Indians will receive less than
impartial justice from tribal courts. If it appears that tribal courts
are abusing their exclusive jurisdiction in these matters, the
remedy is with Congress, which has already taken steps to ensure
that tribal courts comport with accepted notions of due process

122. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982); see also Iowa
Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18. The Department of Justice also proceeds upon the presumption that
Indian tribes have jurisdiction over both Indians and non-Indians.
Tribal courts are essential mechanisms for resolving civil disputes that arise on the
reservation or otherwise affect the interests of the tribe or its members. In the
absence of a contrary treaty or statutory provision, tribal courts are presumed to
have jurisdiction over such civil litigation, including actions involving non-Indians.
The integrity of and respect for tribal courts are critical for encouraging economic
development and investment on the reservations by Indians and non-Indians alike.
Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, JUDIcATURE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at

114 (footnote omitted).
123. "The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments
over their reservations .... If this power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to
do it." Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1958) (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,
564-66 (1903)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

and equal protection by enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act,
§202(8), 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1982).'1
3. Delegation/Retentionof "Sovereignty"
One problem remains with tribal jurisdiction over in rem forfeitures. One
might argue that the federal government is the real "sovereign" in such a civil
forfeiture proceeding, because Congress has plenary power over Indians and
the Indians possess only those incidents of sovereignty that Congress has
carved out from the federal government's bundle of powers. Any forfeiture
action would perfect the federal government's title in the property."
One response to this argument is that Congress either delegated power to the
Indians to act as "sovereign" or confrmed an already existing power." The
Tribal Justice System Act states that "there is a government-to-government
relationship between the United States and each Indian tribe . . . ."
A
"government-to-government relationship" implies that Indians are a separate
sovereign. Congress has made clear that tribes are not simply the neglected
stepchild of the federal government, but instead are independent governments:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to... imply that any tribal justice
system is an instrumentality of the United States."'" If Congress delegated a
measure of its sovereign status, then the delegation could include the power to
perfect Indian title through tribal proceedings." If Congress simply confirmed
power the tribes had under existing law as separate sovereigns, then the existing
power would include power to perfect Indian title.
One Supreme Court case has held that Indian tribes are in fact a separate
sovereign. In United States v. Wheeler,' Anthony Wheeler pleaded guilty
in tribal court to contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a misdemeanor.
Wheeler was later indicted in federal court on a charge of rape for the same
acts.' Wheeler challenged the federal prosecution claiming that the tribal
government and the federal government were the same sovereign and that a
second prosecution would, therefore, violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.

124. Superior Oil Co. v. Merritt, 619 F. Supp. 526, 534 (D. Utah 1985).
125. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
126. See supra part IV.B.2.
127. 25 U.S.C. § 3601(1) (1994).
128. li. § 3601(5).
129. Tribes retain the power to acquire land by purchase in the tribal name, but the purchase
must be approved by the federal government. COHEN 1982 ED., supra note 87, at 482. The
Cherokee Reservation in North Carolina, the Sac and Fox Reservation in Iowa, the Choctaw
Reservation in Mississippi, and several small Sioux communities in Minnesota were all acquired
by purchase of aboriginal homelands after removal. Id. at 482-83.
130. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
131. Id. at 314-17.
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The Supreme Court held that the tribal court had power to prosecute
Wheeler and that the source of the tribe's criminal jurisdiction over its own
members was the tribe's inherent sovereignty, not as a result of a delegation
by the federal government.' For purposes of assessing tribal forfeiture
provisions, a tribe may be a separate sovereign. There are, however, two
problems with extending the Wheeler decision. First, Wheeler involved Indian
sovereignty over the tribe's own members. Second, the Court noted that
Indian tribes had lost the aspects of sovereignty that had been divested "by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status"' 3 as well as the
aspects that Congress had explicitly withdrawn.
The Court noted that "the areas in which such implicit divestiture of
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations
between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe."''" The Court might
limit Indian tribes' status as "sovereign" to cases involving tribal members. On
the other hand, the Court has also noted that Indian tribes retain sovereignty
over both their members and their territory.'35 In addition, many other
Supreme Court cases implicitly extend Indians' status as "sovereign" to civil
cases involving non-Indians. When the Wheeler Court listed some areas of
implicit divestiture, it referred to the assumption of criminaljurisdiction over
nonmembers.' In Duro v. Reina 37 the Court acknowledged that tribal
civil jurisdiction was different than tribal criminal jurisdiction. The Court
stated that its decisions regarding tribal civil jurisdiction "recognize broader
retained tribal powers."'3 Tribes may enjoy the status of "sovereign" in
relation to non-Indians and nonmembers in civil proceedings. Focusing on the
difference between tribal sovereignty in civil matters and tribal sovereignty in
criminal matters brings one back to the Montana analysis. It is likely that
answering the Montana analysis question of, "Does the tribe have jurisdiction?" will answer - and is in fact the same as - the question, "Is the tribe
the Sovereign?"
A related issue, and one considered by the Wheeler Court, is the effect of
the implicit divestiture of Indians' power to alienate land. The touchstone of
the Indians' "domestic dependent status" is that tribes gave up the power to
alienate their lands. The United States holds Indian lands in trust for the tribe.
Based on this limitation, one might argue that tribal forfeiture laws which
attempt to forfeit land would be invalid because only the sovereign (the

132. Id. at 328-29; see also id. at 328 n.24 ("This Court has referred to treaties made with
the Indians as 'not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them - a
reservation of those not granted." (quoting United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371,381 (1905))).
133. Id. at 323.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
138. Id. at 687-88.
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United States) can bring proceedings to perfect the sovereign's title. If
Congress delegated this power to the tribes, forfeiture of real property would
be valid. If not, tribal forfeiture laws would be limited to forfeiture of nonreal property.
C. Direct Effect on the Tribe
Even in the absence of congressional delegation, tribes retain civil
jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians when the activity occurs on
property located within the reservation if the activity has a "direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
'
tribe."139
The exercise of jurisdiction over forfeitures satisfies this element
of the Montana test in several ways. First, contraband directly affects the
health and welfare of the tribe, and may affect its economic security as well.
Second, forfeiture laws deprive lawbreakers of the instrumentalities and the
proceeds of crime. For example, depriving a drug smuggler of a vehicle used
to transport drugs across or within Indian land protects the health and welfare
of the tribe. Third, because the tribe is seeking to perfect its title to the
property at issue and because regulation of reservation land is directly related
to sovereignty, denying the tribe jurisdiction would have a direct effect on the
political integrity of the tribe.
To some extent, Congress has already addressed this issue. In the Tribal
Justice Systems Act, Congress tracked the language of Montana to state that
"tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve as
important forums for ensuring public health and safety and the political
integrity of tribal governments."' Congress also found that tribal justice
systems and tribal courts are "the appropriate forums for the adjudication of
disputes affecting personal and property rights.''. Tribal courts are appropriate forums for the resolution of personal and property rights of both
Indian and non-Indian individuals."
These two congressional findings
strongly support the exercise of civil jurisdiction by tribal courts.
1. The Economic Security, Health, or Welfare of the Tribe
Law enforcement on Indian reservations is directly related to the health and
welfare of Indian tribes. The cumulative effect of Oliphant and congressional
acts affecting criminal jurisdiction on reservations has left a void in law

139. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 556 (1981) (citations omitted). There may be
two aspect,; to this portion of the Montana analysis. Courts should assess (1) the effect that the
activities of the non-Indians will have on the tribe and (2) "what the effect would be if the tribe
were categorically denied the regulatory authority it sought to assert." Bowen, supra note 87, at
657 nn.409-10. Bowen noted that this two part analysis was the analysis the district court
undertook in South Dakota v. Bourland, No 88-3049, slip. op. at 9-18 (D.S.D. Aug. 21, 1990).
140. 25 U.S.C. § 3601(5) (1994).
141. Id. § 3601(6).
142. S. REP. No. 88, supra note 120, at 8.
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enforcement, and has resulted in reservations being labelled "havens" for
criminal offenders.'43 Indian tribes face a Hobson's choice: Exclude nonIndians entirely from the reservation and lose valuable revenue, or invite nonIndians on the reservation and risk lawless acts by individuals who are
immune to punishment by the tribe.
Forfeiture of contraband is a remedial measure that protects the economic
security, health, and welfare of the tribe because it removes dangerous or
illegal items from Indian society,"4 items in which individuals have no legal
property right.4 Civil forfeiture also compensates the tribe for injury
suffered as a result of the illegal activity. Forfeiture of proceeds will diminish
the entry of contraband onto reservations and will support the tribe in its
efforts to maintain the safety of the reservation.
The Supreme Court has cited a number of cases that sustain the exercise
of civil jurisdiction over "the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe."'" In one such case, Williams v. Lee, 47 the Court held that a tribal
court had exclusive jurisdiction over an action brought by a non-Indian against
an Indian to recover the price of goods sold on credit to the Indian on the
reservation. The Court stated:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state
jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal
courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the
right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that
respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the
transaction with an Indian took place there. The cases in this
Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian
governments over their reservations .... If this power is to be

taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it."4

Tribal forfeiture provisions would protect the tribe from lawless outsiders by
returning a great measure of authority over their reservations to the tribal
governments regarding activities and transactions that occur on the reservation.

143. See supra part I.
144. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,620 (1993); United States v. One Assortment
of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984).
145. Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 3738 and accompanying text (stating that contraband is intrinsically illegal).
146. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
147. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
148. Id. at 223.
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2. The Tribe's PoliticalIntegrity

In a civil forfeiture, the sovereign brings an action to perfect title to
property that has been connected with violations of the laws of the sovereign.

For example, money that is used to purchase illicit drugs becomes property
of the sovereign at the time of the transaction.Indian tribes possess power to

enact and enforce forfeiture laws because tribes possess power to regulate
both persons and property within a reservation. This power is necessary for

any sovereign to have political integrity.
The power to regulate non-Indian individuals on Indian reservations is a

basic governmental power that the Court has consistently held as within the
elements of the sovereignty that the Indians retain. 49 "Indian selfgovernment, the decided cases hold, [also] includes the power of an Indian
tribe to adopt and operate under a form of government of the Indians'
choosing ....to regulatepropertywithin the jurisdictionof the tribe....and
to administer justice."'' " This statement leads of the question of, "What is
within the jurisdiction of the tribe?" The reasonable answer, however, is that

the tribe's jurisdiction is coterminous with the reservation's boundaries.
The boundaries of sovereignty and the boundaries of tribal jurisdiction are

linked to territorial boundaries.'

Indian tribes have a direct and vital

interest in their land. Federal courts look to the effect of treaties and statutes
on Indian territories to determine whether tribal sovereignty has been

149. Charles F. Wilkinson, Basic Doctrines of American Indian Law, in INDIANS AND
CRIMINAL JuSTICE 75 (Laurence French ed., 1982); see also Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior
Dec. 14 (D-ec. 14, 1934), reprintedin I U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR
OF THE DEP'ARTMENT OF INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1917-1974, at 445 (1979)
[hereinafter Op. SoLtc. DEP'r INTERIOR] (stating that Indian Nations have the power to regulate
the use of property by their members and by non-Indians within their jurisdiction).
150. FELIx S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122-23 (Univ. of N.M. photo.
reprint 1971) (1942).
151. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136. 151 (1980) ("[T]here is a
significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty."); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223
(1958) (finding that a merchant's status as a non-Indian is irrelevant to the question whether the
tribe had juisdiction over him because the merchant's business was within the tribe's reservation
and the debt at issue arose on the reservation); United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724, 727
(1992) ("A tribal court presumptively has jurisdiction over activities that take place on tribal
land."); see also Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987) (citations omitted)
(stating that civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands presumptively
lies in tribal courts). See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J.
1, 2-5, 43-63 (1995) (asserting that control over territory is the most essential element of
sovereignty).
Territorial boundaries are not only linked to "inherent sovereignty," territorial boundaries also
determine whether the land is Indian country for purposes of federal law. COHEN 1982 ED., supra
note 87, at 499 (citing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); Decoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S.'425 (1975)). In addition, vacillating federal policy towards the status of
Indian tribes has always linked the extent of self-determination and self-government to title and
control of Indian land.
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diminished. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima

Nation,' a Supreme Court inquiry into the extent of tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians turned on the extent to which the tribe had preserved the
"character" of the reservation land.' The enactment and enforcement of
forfeiture law is an effective and important method by which tribes may
control the character of the reservation land. Forfeiture law removes
contraband - property which is illegal and would alter the character of the
reservation - from persons who would bring it onto the reservation.
Forfeiture is an alternative to the criminaljustice system. It is a method of
regulatory enforcement"4 that protects Indian tribes' lands and political
integrity.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the importance of
sovereignty to Indians. In a 1981 decision, the Supreme Court quoted a 1879
Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee:
We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the right of
self-government and jurisdictionover the persons and property
within the limits of the territorythey occupy, except so far as that

jurisdiction has been restrained and abridged by treaty or act of
Congress. Subject to the supervisory control of the Federal
Government, they may enact the requisitelegislation to maintain
peace and good order, improve their condition, establish school

systems, and aid their people in their efforts to acquire the arts of
civilized life.'"
Civil forfeiture proceedings would protect the Indians' special interest in
maintaining peace and good order within their territory. They are in fact
necessary to maintain peace and good order on reservations because Indian
tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
D. Consensual Relationships
Montana established a second exception under which tribes may exercise
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. Tribes "may regulate, through taxation,
licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements."" This portion of the Montana
analysis focuses on consensual relationships in a "commercial" context. One
might argue, however, that entry of non-Indians onto the reservation is

152. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
153. See infra part V.
154. Cheh, supra note 21, at 1340 (citing Fried, supra note 31, at 381).
155. Merrion v. Jicailla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140 (1982) (quoting S. REP. No. 698,
45th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1879) (emphases added)).
156. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (citations omitted).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996

334

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

"commercial," or that other non-commercial consensual relationships also give
rise to tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Supreme Court has stated that
"Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of a nonmember; to the
contrary, the nonmembers presence and conduct on Indian lands is conditioned by the limitations the tribe may choose to impose."'5 7 The very act
of entering onto Indian land begins a consensual relationship, making tribal
jurisdiction appropriate.
To make this consent explicit, tribes could post signs that condition entry
to the reservation upon consent to tribal jurisdiction in the event of a
forfeiture proceeding. The Suquamish Tribe, for example, has this type of
warning posted below a highway sign that reads, "Entering Port Madison
Indian Reservation." The warning states: "ENTRANCE ONTO THE
RESERVATION WILL BE DEEMED TO IMPLY CONSENT TO SUBMISSION TO THE LAWFUL JURISDICTION OF THE SUQUAMISH INDIAN
TRIBE."'5 One might analogize this consensual relationship to a choice of
law provision in a unilateral contract. One consents to tribal jurisdiction upon
entering the reservation for civil actions which occur on the Indian land.
Montana actually lists contracts as one area within the purview of the
consensual relationship.
E. Power To Exclude
In Montana, the Supreme Court reiterated that one of the attributes of
sovereignty is the power to exclude non-Indians from Indian lands.'59 The
Court emphasized the lower court's finding that "Montana's statutory scheme
does not prevent the Crow Tribe from limiting or forbidding non-Indian
hunting and fishing on lands still owned by or held in trust for the Tribe or
its members.""Iw Land owned by or held in trust for the Tribe or its members is of a different character than land owned by non-Indians. 6'
In Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, the Court stated:
[N]onmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to
the tribe's power to exclude them. This power necessarily includes

157. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 147.
158. KIRKE KICKINGBIRD ET AL., INDIAN JURISDICTION I (Institute for the Development of
Indian Law 1983); see also 4 NATIONAL AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N, EXAMINATION OF
THE BAsIs OF TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER AUTHORITY: JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 50-51

(National American Indian Court Judges Association., Inc. 1974) (discussing implied consent
ordinances adopted by the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, the Gila River Indian
Community, and the Quinalt Indian Tribe).
159. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557-63 (1981).

160. Id.
at 557-67.
161. "Because the exclusionary power is a fundamental sovereign attribute intimately tied
to a tribe's ability to protect the integrity and order of its territory and the welfare of its members,
it is an internal matter over which sovereignty is retained." COHEN 1982 ED., supra note 87, at
252.
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a lesser power to place conditions on entry, on continued
presence, or on reservation conduct .... When a tribe grants a
non-Indian the right to be on Indian land, the tribe agrees not to
exercise its ultimate power to oust the non-Indian as long as the
non-Indian complies with the initial conditions of entry. However,
it does not follow that the lawful property right to be on Indian
land also immunizes the non-Indian from the tribe's exercise of its
lesser-included power

. . .

to place ...

conditions on the non-

Indian's conduct or continued presence on the reservation."
This understanding of tribal sovereignty comports with the civil nature of
forfeiture. The tribe could limit or forbid those acts that it deems unlawful on
tribal land as a lesser power of the acknowledged power to exclude." This
limit would be enforceable by the exercise of civil jurisdiction over the
property. Indians would exercise civil jurisdiction to perfect their title to
property involved in illegal activity.
F. Conclusion
Oliphant and the Montanaanalysis of jurisdiction both support the exercise
of tribal jurisdiction in an in rem forfeiture proceeding. Property is not racial
in character and the resolution of property disputes is an internal matter.
Tribal courts, therefore, should have jurisdiction over in rem forfeitures.
Congress has not forbidden this exercise of tribal sovereignty. Instead,
Congress has clearly stated that tribal courts are the appropriate forums for
disputes affecting personal and property rights of Indians and non-Indians.
Crime and the need for law enforcement against non-Indians and Indians
located on reservations have a direct effect on the political integrity and the
health and welfare of Indian tribes. In addition, forfeiture is a regulatory
power that is a lesser power of the power to exclude non-Indians from the
reservation. Indians have the power to place conditions on the entry of nonIndians to the reservation.
All of these factors support the tribe's power to enact and enforce civil
forfeiture provisions. Congress has itself enacted many forfeiture provisions,
which indicates that Congress considers forfeiture to be an essential aspect of
its sovereignty. Congress also has made specific findings that support tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians in civil matters. If Congress believes that this
exercise of tribal sovereignty is excessive, Congress may exercise its plenary
power and limit tribal sovereignty. Federal courts must not engage in judicial

162. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-45 (1982) (footnote omitted).
163. See, e.g., id. at 146-48 (upholding tribe's power to impose oil and gas severance tax on
non-Indian lessees of reservation land as a lesser included power of the power to exclude from
reservation lands).
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activism in this area; to do so would be contrary to Congress's intent. The
remedy for an abuse of tribal sovereignty remains with Congress.
V. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation
The power to exclude is usually discussed in terms of the power to exclude
people. But an additional argument supporting tribal jurisdiction in a civil
forfeiture is that tribes retain the power to exclude property as well as people.
If the power to exclude means anything, it must mean that Indians possess the
right to exclude contraband that would alter the character of the Indian people
and the Indian land.'" Contraband is property that is "intrinsically illegal"
and the sovereign forbids possession of it.'" Forfeiture of contraband is
especially appropriate because there is no lawful "property right" in
contraband.
In 1989, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the Indians' right to
exclude. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Nation,'" the Yakima Indian Nation (the Tribe) petitioned the Court in three
separate actions to uphold the Tribe's right to zone and impose land use laws
on land that non-Indians owned within the reservation. The reservation
consisted of two distinct "areas" that the Court labelled "open" and
"closed."'"
The Court divided into three factions in its decision. Justice White, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, found that the
Tribe had no regulatory authority over lands held in fee by non-Indians.'"
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, found that the
Tribe had authority to exercise civil jurisdiction over the activities of nonIndians in these cases because zoning and land use laws implicated a
significant tribal interest and qualified as an exception under the Montana
test.'" Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O'Connor, came to a somewhat
"Solomonic" decision.' Justice Stevens found that the Tribe had authority
to zone the "closed area" of the reservation, but the Tribe did not have
authority to zone the "open area" of the reservation.'
Justice Stevens's
opinion not only split the Reservation, it also split the court. None of the

164. See infra part V.B.
165. See supra note 37.
166. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
167. Although all of the opinions treat the reservation as consisting of two distinct areas, the
members of the Court did not all agree that this was the case. Justice White stated that an
intervening decision by the Bureau of Indian Affairs had opened the "closed area" to the public.
Id. at 415 n.2.
168. Id at 425.
169. Id at 450.

170. Id at 448 (Justice Blackmum wrote that the "[e]ourt's combined judgment in these
consolidated cases ... is Solomonic in appearance only.").
171. Id at 444-45.
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three opinions commanded a majority of the Court but Justices Stevens and
O'Connor cast the deciding votes in all three actions.
A. Justice Stevens's Solomonic Opinion
Justice Stevens stated that the "tribe's power to exclude nonmembers from
a defined geographical area obviously includes the lesser power to define the
character of that area."'" The Tribe had adopted resolutions restricting
entrance to the "closed area" to protect the area's distinctive resources. In
addition, the "closed area" consisted of 807,000 acres, only 25,000 of which
were owned in fee." Thus, Justice Stevens found that the Tribe had a
"historic and consistent interest in preserving the pristine character of this
vast, uninhabited portion of its reservation."'74 The "open area," on the other
hand, was a much smaller area, a large portion of which was owned by
nonmembers as a result of the Indian General Allotment Act (also known as
the Dawes Act).'"
Justice Stevens stated that the labels "open area" and "closed area" were
"irrelevant" to his analysis. "What is important," Justice Stevens wrote, "is
that the Tribe has maintained a defined area in which only a very small
percentage of the land is held in fee and another defined area in which
approximately half of the land is held in fee."' 76 For Justice Stevens, the
demographics of the area and the percentage of fee ownership were the
determining factors." The extent of the Tribe's sovereignty originally
included the power to exclude non-Indians from the entire reservation, but the
alienation of property in the "open area" resulted in
an integrated community that is not economically or culturally
delimited by reservation boundaries.... Because the Tribe no
longer has the power to exclude nonmembers from a large portion
of this area, it also lacks the power to define the essential
character of the territory. As a result, the Tribe's interest in
preventing inconsistent uses is dramatically curtailed.'
Justice Stevens found that the Tribe retained a strong interest in preserving
the character of the "closed area." Congress did not intend that tribes would

172. Id. at 434.
173. Id. at 438-40.

174. Id.
at 440.
175. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 381 (1994)). The Dawes Act provided for the allotment and
subsequent alienation of reservation land. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 436.
176. Brendale,492 U.S. at 437 n.2.

177. Id.at 447-48. The members of the Yakima Nation comprised less than twenty percent
of the total population of the "open area." Id. at 445.

178. Id. at 444-45.
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lose control over the character of their entire reservation based on the transfer
of a small percentage of land.""
B. Brentdhle and Civil Forfeiture
Justice Stevens's opinion suggests that tribal jurisdiction in a civil forfeiture
affecting property of a non-Indian might be proper as a lesser part of the
power to exclude only if the situs of the action giving rise to the forfeiture
was located in a "closed" portion of the reservation. To qualify as a closed
portion of the reservation, the tribe must have an interest in preserving the
character of that portion of its reservation. The tribe does not have to forbid
nonmembers entirely from entering the area, but the area must be distinct in
its importance to the tribe. In Brendale, the fact that nonmembers had access
to the "closed area" and the right to drive on roads that traversed the "closed
area" did not eliminate the tribe's right to determine the character of that area
of the reservation.m Justice Stevens was satisfied that the tribe still retained
the power to exclude, which "necessarily must include the lesser power to
regulate land use in the interest of protecting the tribal community."''
Tribes generally retain the power to exclude. Congress may diminish that
power by federal statute, or the Tribe may voluntarily surrender the power to
exclude." Although Brendale appears to bear directly on the issue of tribal jurisdiction, Justice Stevens's opinion may provide little insight into the propriety of
tribal forfeiture laws, for at least three reasons. First, it may be too dependent
on or tied to the specific instance of an attempt to exercise jurisdiction in a
zoning capacity. Justice Stevens wrote that zoning was intimately related to
the maintenance of cultural and community self-definition. "Zoning is the
process whereby a community defines its essential character."'8 The Court
might find that civil forfeiture is not necessary to define the tribe's "essential
character." (On the other hand, forfeiture would provide tribal law enforcement authorities with a practical method to protect the character of Indian
land.) Second, Brendale may be distinguishable from a forfeiture action
because forfeiture does not require jurisdiction over a person. In a civil
forfeiture, the sovereign proceeds directly against the property; therefore,
Justice Stevens's Brendale test might not apply at all. Third, Stevens's opinion
might provide little assistance when evaluating tribal forfeiture laws, because

179. Id. at 441.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 440.
Id. at 433.
Id.
Id. Stevens is afraid that nonmembers will not respect the religious or spiritual

importance the tribe places in the land -

that they will "bring a pig into the parlor." See

generally C.E. Willoughby, Comment, Native American Sovereignty Takes a Back Seat to the
"Pig in the Parlor', The Redefining of Tribal Sovereignty in Traditional Property Law Terms,
19 S. ILL. U. L.J 593 (1995).
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any analysis drawn from the opinions in Brendale digresses into a Montana
analysis.
Justice Stevens accepted the district court's finding that the conduct of nonIndians in the "closed area" on fee lands posed a threat to the welfare of the
tribe.'" This finding parallels one of the factors in the Montana analysis.
A tribe may retain civil jurisdiction over non-Indians if the conduct of nonIndians has a "direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe."" Thus, Justice Stevens's opinion
ultimately may differ from Justice White's opinion only in its acceptance of
this finding. Justice White's opinion followed a Montana analysis, but when
it reached the "direct effect" portion of the test, it heightened the degree of
proof necessary to establish tribal authority. Justice White stated:
Montana suggests that in the special circumstances of checkerboard ownership of lands within a reservation, the tribe has an
interest under federal law, defined in terms of the impact of the
challenged uses on the political integrity, economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe. But, as we have indicated
above, that interest does not entitle the tribe to complain or obtain
relief against every use of fee land that has some effect on the
tribe. The impact must be demonstrably serious and must imperil
the political integrity, economic security, or the health and welfare
of the tribe."
Brendale appears to be a battle over the importance and distinctiveness of
tribes and their sovereignty. The Blackmun trio found that the nonmembers'
conduct had a direct effect on the tribe. This alone was enough. Justices
Stevens and O'Connor accepted the district court's finding that the actions had
a direct effect, but added an additional inquiry into the demographics. Justice
White's group of four put the burden of proof on the Tribe to intervene in
federal court, and to establish that the actual uses authorized by the Yakima
County zoning authorities on the nonmembers' property were demonstrably
serious, did not respect the rights of the Tribe, and would imperil the political
integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe. 87
Recent changes in the Court's composition emphasize the inquiry into
whether a nonmember's conduct has a direct effect on the tribe.'88 None of
the Blackmun trio remain on the Court. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and

184. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 443.
185. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 556 (1981) (citations omitted).
186. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 430-31.
187. Id.at 431-32.
188. Even the more recent case of South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), discussed
inftra at part VI, did not decide which of the three tests determined whether there is a direct effect.
The Bourland Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit on this issue. Id. at 695.
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Thomas might side with any of the three Brendale factions. All three factions
require some type of analysis into the effect a nonmember's action has on the
tribe. Establishing tribal jurisdiction over a civil forfeiture proceeding,
therefore, will require some proof of an effect on the tribe. It may require
proof that forfeiture proceedings involve an important aspect of sovereignty,
that it has a demonstrably serious impact on tribes, and that it imperils the
political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe.
VI. Bourlandand a CurrentAssessment of Tribal Forfeiture's Prospects
In a 1993 case, South Dakota v. Bourland," the Supreme Court reaffirmed the fundamental Montana analysis of a tribe's civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians. The Court's reasoning in Montana, Brendale, and Bourland
indicates that Indian tribes may exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
tribal land located within a reservation if Congress delegates jurisdiction to the
tribe, or if either of the two Montana exceptions are satisfied (consent of the
non-Indians or establishing a significant tribal interest). Bourland heightened
the importance of determining whether the tribe retains the power to exclude
non-Indians. If the tribe retains such power, it also retains the power to
regulate non-Indians, and it is likely that the tribe has extensive civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Indian sovereignty is at its fullest, and tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians is in fact presumed, when a tribe seeks to exert
civil controls over Indian land that is owned by or held in trust for the tribe.
A. South Dakota v. Bourland
Bourlandpresented the Supreme Court with another opportunity to assess
the status of the Montana analysis. In Bourland, South Dakota challenged the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's authority to enforce tribal hunting and fishing
regulations against non-Indians on land that had been taken by the federal
government to build the Oahe Dam and Reservoir (the "taken land"). The
Government acquired 104,420 acres of land owned by or in trust for the tribe
and 18,000 acres of land owned privately and held in fee by non-Indians."f
All of the land acquired by the Government was located within the reservation.
The Court applied the Montana analysis and concluded that Congress did
not affirmatively delegate authority over the taken land to the tribe. The Court
then cited both Montana and Brendale for the proposition that the tribe's
power to exclude had terminated when the tribe alienated the land."9 ' The
Court reasoned that the loss of the power to exclude non-Indians included a

189. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
190. l at 683-84.
191. let at 689. The Court noted that the district court had found that the taken land was not
"closed" or "pristine," and that "the area at issue here has been broadly opened to the public."
Id. at 689 n.9.
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loss in the tribe's power to regulate non-Indians. "The power to regulate is of
diminished practical use if it does not include the power to exclude: regulatory
authority goes hand in hand with the power to exclude."'"
The Court next evaluated general principles of "inherent sovereignty" The
Court applied the Montana presumption against tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians 93 and found that a tribe's inherent sovereignty does not extend to the
relations between a tribe and nonmembers on land that the tribe does not own,
unless one of the two Montana exceptions applies.' The Court remanded
the case to the Eighth Circuit to evaluate these issues. 95
B. Assessing Tribal JurisdictionAfter Bourland
Although the Court reaffirmed the basic Montana analysis, the Bourland
decision is fairly limited in its prescriptions. Two issues appear clear. First,
when an Indian Tribe invokes general principles of "inherent sovereignty" as
a source of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands, the
Court applies the Montana presumption against tribal authority. This
presumption is overcome only if Congress expressly delegates such power or
one of the two Montana exceptions applies." Second, when land within a
reservation is alienated to non-Indians, the Court will consider the legislation
carefully. If the legislation "opens" this land within the reservation so that the
Indians do not have the right of exclusive occupation or the power to exclude,
then the Court will find that the tribe has lost the power to enforce its
regulations against non-Indians on the taken land."
For purposes of this article, Bourlandmay be as important for what it does
not say as for what it says. Bourlanddoes not mean that in every case where
reservation land has been opened to outsiders the Indian Tribe will lose its
right to regulate. The Court stated that "[t]he abrogation of this greater right,
at least in the context of the type of area at issue in this case, implies the loss
of regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land by others." '98 The Court's
limitation to the facts of this case implies that the right to regulate was not
completely abrogated.'" The Court noted that Bourland involved an area
that was neither a closed area nor a pristine area: it was "broadly" open.'

192. Id. at 691 n.ll.
193. Id. at 694-95. "The exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation .... " Montana v. United

States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
194. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 695 n.15.
195. Id. at 695.
196. Id.; see also Bowen, supra note 87, at 644 nn.315-16.
197. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 688-91; Bowen, supra note 87, at 645 nn.317-19.
198. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
199. Bowen, supra note 87, at 645 n.319.
200. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 689 n.9.
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"If a case involved an area that was not 'broadly' open, was 'pristine,' or was

'significant to the tribe culturally, religiously, or economically,' then the Court
might conclude that the loss of the tribe's treaty right to exclude does not
necessarily mean that the right to regulate was also abrogated by the
alienation of the land."2' 1
Bourlands adoption of a presumption against tribal authority over non-

Indians is also limited to the facts of the case. This presumption applies only
when the activities of non-Indians occur on alienated land - land that is
owned by non-Indians.' When a tribe seeks to assert authority over the
activities of non-Indians and the activities occur on tribal lands, the Court
should presume that Indians retain inherent sovereignty.' The Bourland
decision itself indicates that if the tribe retains the right to exclude, the tribe

should have broad power to regulate non-Indians, because the tribe has
retained the fullest amount of sovereignty. "[R]egulatory authority goes hand
in hand with the power to exclude."' Finally, the findings made and the
assumptions expressed by Congress in the Indian Tribal Justice Act

contravene the presumption against tribal jurisdiction that underlies the
Bourland decision. Congress presumes that tribes retain jurisdiction.'
VII. Relevant Cases
Although there are no cases assessing directly the propriety of tribally

enacted and enforced forfeiture provisions, several cases may be relevant to
such an analysis. This part of the article will discuss three such cases. In
Hamilton v. United States,' the U.S. Court of Claims assessed whether it

201. Bowen, supra note 87, at 645 n.322 (quoting Bourland, 508 U.S. at 689 n.9).
202. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 692-95.
203. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408,443
(1989) (upholding tribal authority to zone fee lands located in a "closed" area, but denying
authority to zone fee lands in the "open" area of the reservation); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-45 (1982) ("Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of a
nonmember; to the contrary, the nonmembers presence and conduct on Indian lands is
conditioned by the limitations the Tribe may choose to impose."); Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) ("The power to tax transactions
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental
attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary
implication of their dependent status."); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-69 (1975)
("The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their
reservations .... If this power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it."). See
supra part IV.B.2 (Congress's findings in the Indian Tribal Justice Act require presumption of
tribal sovereignty on reservation land).
204. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 691 n.l 1 (citing Brendale, 492 U.S. at 423-24); see also id. at
688 (stating that the power to regulate non-Indian use of taken land is a "lesser-included,
incidental power" of the power to exclude non-Indians).
205. See discussion supra part IV.B.2
206. 42 Ct. Cl. 282 (1907).
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had jurisdiction over a case in which a tribe seized and sold the property of
a non-Indian located within a reservation. In Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo
Indian Tibe,' the Ninth Circuit evaluated the Navajo Tribe's enactment and
enforcement of a civil ordinance governing self-help repossession within the
reservation's boundaries. These two cases involve civil ordinances enacted by
tribes that extend tribal sovereignty over property located on the reservation
as a result of the actions of non-Indians, and the cases support the position
taken in this article. One additional case may cut the other way. In Quechan
Tribe of Indians v. Rowe," the Ninth Circuit held that the Quechan Tribe,
in the Quechan Constitution itself, had foresworn the power to forfeit weapons
of a non-Indian as a consequence of violating tribal law.
A. Hamilton v. United States

In 1907, the United States Court of Claims held in Hamilton v. United
States ' that it had no jurisdiction over James Hamilton's claim against the
United States and the Chickasaw Nation."' Hamilton was a non-Indian who
accepted a license to trade with the Chickasaw Nation. Hamilton purchased
a number of dwellings, storehouses, and other buildings valued at $3050 from
the United States. The buildings were all located on the Chickasaw Reservation.
The Chickasaw Nation took possession of the property and sold it pursuant
to a statute passed by the Chickasaw legislature."1 ' Hamilton brought suit in
the Court of Claims to recover the value of the property taken. Hamilton
based his claim on the Indian Depredations Act of March 3, 1891. The Court
of Claims held that it had no jurisdiction in the case. The Act conferred
jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims
to inquire into and finally adjudicate ...[a~ll claims for property

of citizens of the United States taken or destroyed by Indians
belonging to any band, tribe, or nation in amity with the United
States, without just cause or provocation on the part of the owner
or agent in charge, and not returned or paid for.212
The court stated that the Act provided relief for the forcible and illegal taking
or destruction of property by Indians, but it did not provide relief for "a

207. 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
208. 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976).
209. 42 Ct. Cl. 282 (1907).
210. Id. at 286-87.
211. Id. at 282. The Chickasaw Treaty, July 10, 1866, 14 Stat. 772, provided that the
Chickasaw general assembly had power to legislate and that all laws enacted by the assembly
would take effect unless suspended by the Secretary of the Interior or the President.
212. Id. at 286.
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peaceful taking of property in pursuance of law and after due notice of an

intention to do

so.1123

In Hamilton, the Court of Claims recognized the power of the tribe over
its territory. The Court stated that, by applying for and accepting a license to
trade with the Chickasaws and acquiring property within the limits of the
Chickasaw reservation, Hamilton subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the
tribe's laws." 4 That Hamilton is a Court of Claims' decision does not limit
its reasoning to suits brought under the Indian Depredations Act. The Solicitor
General cited Hamilton in an opinion titled "Powers of Indian Tribes."2 ' In
the section titled "Tribal Powers Over Property," the solicitor concluded:
It clearly appears from the foregoing cases, that the powers of
an Indian tribe are not limited to such powers as it may exercise
in its capacity as a landowner. In its capacity as a sovereign, and
in the exercise of local self-government, it may exercise powers
similar to those exercised by any State or nation in regulating the
use and disposition of private property, save insofar as it is
restricted by specific statutes of Congress. 6
Forfeitun is one method a sovereign employs to "regulat[e] the use and
disposition of private property."
Hamilton and the Solicitor's reference to the case make clear that tribal
forfeiture is appropriate if the tribe enacts a statute, gives notice of its intent
to forfeit property, and follows prescribed procedures.
B. BabbiT Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe
Hamilton initially indicates that by accepting a license to trade with a tribe
and acquiring property within the limits of a reservation, non-Indians subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the tribe, whose land they enter and use. The
next important question is whether mere presence on a reservation is enough
for a tribe to exercise civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian's property.
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit applied the Montana test and extended tribal
jurisdiction to non-Indians as a result of their presence on a reservation in
Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe.27 The Ninth Circuit upheld the
Navajo Tribe's enactment and enforcement of a civil ordinance governing selfhelp repossession within the reservation's boundaries. Although the Supreme

213. ME
214. Id. at 287.
215. 55 Interior Dec. 14,55 (1934), reprinted in Op. SOLIc. DEP'T INTERIOR, supra note 149,
at 445, 470. The Solicitor also quoted the case of Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 38 Ct.
Cl. 234, 251 (1903), decree modified, 193 U.S. 127 (1904) ("T]he law of real property is to be
found in the law of the situs. The law of real property in the Cherokee country, therefore, is to
be found in the constitution and laws of the Cherokee Nation.").
216. 55 Interior Dec. at 55, reprintedin Op. Souc. DEP'r INTERIOR, supranote 149, at 471.
217. 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
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Court subsequently denied certiorari, the Ninth Circuit's opinion is important.
The facts of the case reveal that Babbitt is "closely related to tribal law
enforcement"'1' and therefore may prove directly relevant in assessing the
validity of tribal forfeiture laws. If federal courts are willing to allow tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians based on mere presence on a reservation, then
the courts should uphold tribal jurisdiction over property located on a
reservation. This ruling would not be an extension of Babbitt. It would be a
lesser, included corollary of the Babbitt holding because it affirms tribal
jurisdiction over property located on a reservation, rather than people.
Babbitt owned a car dealership in Arizona that was located near to, but not
within, the boundaries of the Navajo reservation. The dealership sold a
substantial number of automobiles to individual members of the Tribe. Babbitt
made and negotiated all sales at the dealership, and the automobiles were
delivered off of the reservation." 9 The majority of these sales included loan
contracts that gave the dealer a right to repossess the car in case of default.
The Navajo Tribe had an ordinance that prohibited self-help repossessions on
the reservation without first obtaining the permission of either the owner of
the vehicle or the tribal court."' Any nonmember of the Navajo Tribe, who
willfully violated this ordinance could be excluded from the reservation, and
would be liable for liquidated damages."
Babbitt violated the ordinance by entering the reservation and repossessing
vehicles without consent of the owners or the tribal court. The car owners
brought suit in the tribal court. The tribal court found that Babbitt had
violated the ordinance, and the court awarded damages to the owners.' The
Ninth Circuit upheld the ordinance and the tribal court's decision. The court
stated that "[t]he Navajo consent regulation at issue in this matter is a
necessary exercise of tribal self-government and territorial management: the
regulation is designed to keep reservation peace and protect the health and
safety of tribal members." 'm The court noted that the decision in Merrion
v. JicarillaApache Tribe also supported this exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians because "the 'limited authority' over nonmembers does
not arise until they enter tribal lands or conduct business with the tribe."'
Explicit consent to the tribe's exercise of civil jurisdiction was not necessary,
and the tribe did not give up its sovereign power by permitting entry of nonIndians. The tribe merely "agrees not to exercise its ultimate power to oust

218. William V. Vetter, A New Corridorfor the Maze: Tribal CriminalJurisdiction and
Nonmember Indians, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 349, 420 (1992).
219. Babbitt, 710 F.2d at 590.
220. Id. Sections 607 through 609 of the Navajo Tribal Code, Enacted in 1968, contained
the ordinance referred to in Babbitt. NAVAJO TrB. CODE tit. 7, §§ 607-609 (1968).
221. Babbitt, 710 F.2d at 590-91 (citing NAVAJo TRIB. CODE, tit. 7, §§ 607-609).
222. Id. at 591.
223. Id. at 593.
224. Id. (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 142 (1982)).
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the non-Indian as long as the non-Indian complies with the initial conditions
of entry."'
By entering the reservation Babbitt became subject to the tribe's exercise
of sovereign power.'
Oliphant eliminated tribal criminal jurisdiction.
However, tribes stillretain the power to exclude, which includes the power
to "place conditions on entry, on continued presence, [and] on reservation
conduct .... .' The Ninth Circuit found, therefore, that the Navajo Tribe
had authority to exercise civil jurisdiction over Babbitt because he failed to
respect these conditions.
The issue of tribal jurisdiction in a civil forfeiture is very similar to the
issues raised by the repossession ordinance in Babbitt. The civil repossession
ordinance was necessary because the tribe was unable to exercise criminal
jurisdiction. The tribe could not criminally punish Babbitt for failing to obtain
consent of the tribe or the owner, but the tribe could condition and did
condition the entry of nonmembers. Civil forfeitures are likewise necessary
because tribes may not punish non-Indian criminal offenders. Tribes may
condition entry of nonmembers by forbidding certain conduct on the
reservation. Nonmembers would have a "lawful property right to be on Indian
land" but this right would not grant complete immunity from Indian
sovereignty.' Failure to abide by the initial conditions of entry would
permit the tribe to exercise civil jurisdiction over the property involved in the
forbidden conduct.
The Navajo consent regulation at issue in Babbitt satisfied the Montana test
because it was "a necessary exercise of tribal self-government and territorial
management: the regulation [was] designed to keep reservation peace and
protect the health and safety of tribal members."'
The Ninth Circuit's
opinion appears to collapse two of the aspects of the Montana test. Having
a direct effect on the tribe's health and welfare seems to pose a threat to the
tribe's political integrity. Tribal civil forfeiture laws would satisfy Montana
for the same reasons. Exercising jurisdiction over property that is involved in
forbidden conduct is "a necessary exercise of tribal self-government and

225. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144.
226. See id. at 146 ("Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of a nonmember;
to the contrary, the nonmember's presence and conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the
limitations the tribe may choose to impose.").
227. Md.at 144.
228. Babbitt,710 F.2d at 595. Two district court cases seem to contravene a broad extension
of tribal jurisdiction. In UNR Resources v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.M. 1981), and UNR
Resources v. Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981), the trial courts invalidated Navajo
ordinances granting the tribal courts jurisdiction over nonmembers who caused damage on the
reservation. These cases are inapposite to the issue of tribal forfeiture because the damage that
occurred was a spill of radioactive material. The spill occurred outside of the reservation but
resulted in damage to livestock and property within the reservation.
229. Menion, 455 U.S. at 144.
230. Babbitt, 710 F.2d at 593.
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because civil forfeiture laws would assist in
territorial management"'
keeping the peace on the reservation. Civil forfeitures also would protect the
health and safety of tribal members. 32 Forfeiting the instrumentalities
connected with forbidden conduct is an effective deterrent to individuals who
would otherwise violate a tribe's ordinances.
Babbitt is also relevant to forfeiture because it involved implied consent to
jurisdiction by presence on the reservation. Several tribes have enacted
legislation granting tribal courts nonconsensual civil jurisdiction over
nonresidents. " The Supreme Court has taken note of such legislation, but
has not decided whether the exercise of such jurisdiction is proper.'
Nonconsensual tribal jurisdiction over nonresidents is suspect when the
"tribal interest" asserted looks more like an "individual interest." An exercise
of jurisdiction over nonmembers as a result of a tort which occurred off the
reservation and injured members of the tribe, for example, would serve
individual interests, not tribal interests 2 35 Forfeitures are distinct from laws
that simply protect individual interests and jurisdiction is appropriate in such
cases. Forfeiture begins as an offense against the sovereign and forfeited
property belongs to the sovereign. Forfeitures are inherently related to the
interests of the sovereign as sovereign.
C. Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe
Alfred Buker, Chief Game Warden of the Quechan Tribe and an officer of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, was in charge of enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 1165.
He discovered three non-Indians who he believed were violating section 1165
and tribal game ordinances.' Buker did not arrest the non-Indians but he
did confiscate their weapons, explaining that they could reclaim them later at
the tribal headquarters. The non-Indians reported the incident to the county
sheriffs office, which arrested Buker for grand theft of weapons. Although
Buker was released and the charges were dismissed, the tribe filed an action
against the arresting officers seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The
district court granted summary judgment for the tribe and granted the tribe's
request for an injunction.

231. See supra part IV.C.2.
232. See supra part IV.C. 1.
233. Vetter, supra note 218, at 421 n.356.
234. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 138, 142 & n.l (1984); cf
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.3 (1978) (holding that tribe had no
criminal jurisdiction even though they had a sign posted on entrance to reservation to inform
public that entry to reservation would be deemed implied consent to criminaljurisdiction of tribal
court).
235. See Swift Transportation v. John, 546 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Ariz. 1982), vacated as moot,
574 F. Supp. 710 (D.Ariz. 1983).
236. Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

In Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 7 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment, but denied injunctive relief. In addition, the court
declared that the Quechan Tribe did not have power to cause a non-Indian
who entered the reservation unlawfully and violated a tribal game ordinance
to forfeit weapons or other propertyY The court based its decision on its
finding that the tribal officer who seized the weapon did so as evidence for
a tribal prosecution. The court held that the tribal officer lacked such
jurisdiction because the tribe, in the Quechan Constitution itself, had
foresworn the power to try nonmembers of the tribe for violation of tribal
law 9 The court's decision, therefore, was limited to circumstances in which
the forfeiture was effected to further a tribal prosecution of a non-member and
to circumstances in which the tribal constitution specifically forbids the tribe
from doing so. Tribal forfeitures that are the product of specifically
authorized legislation enacted by a tribe and tribal forfeitures that are not
effected for the purpose of tribal prosecution of non-Indians, present an
altogether different situation. Such forfeitures would be civil proceedings and,
as such, would be within the realm of Indian sovereignty.
One limitation on tribal forfeitures that Quechan tangentially addressed is
the fact that a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character.'
Quechan does not directly limit tribal forfeitures because the tribe's
constitution forbid the tribe from trying non-members and the court's decision
is tied to the finding that the weapons were kept for tribal prosecution of nonIndians." In such circumstances, forfeiture violates both the letter and the
spirit of the Supreme Court's Indian law precedent. Civil forfeitures that are
specifically authorized by tribal legislation, on the other hand, meet the letter
of the law. Nevertheless, such forfeiture proceedings are still "quasi-criminal"
in character.

237. Id.
238. 1&.at 411.
239. d.
240. d.(citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965)).
241. The Ninth Circuit did not establish a categorical rule that tribal civil forfeitures are
invalid because they are "quasi-criminal" proceedings. Had the Ninth Circuit done so, it would
have ignored the distinction between the different categories of forfeiture. See supra notes 36-40
and accompanying text (defining "contraband," "instrumentalities," and "proceeds"). The category
of forfeiture at issue affects the analysis that determines whether it is "remedial" or "punishment."
Forfeiture of contraband, for example, is not punishment because an individual has no property
right in contraband. In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237-38
(1972), the Court held that forfeiture as a result of importation without following customs
procedures is entirely remedial, and as such it "is a civil sanction." The Ninth Circuit also did
not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct.
2135 (1996) (holding that in rem forfeiture is not punishment and it is not a criminal proceeding).
The appropriate analysis of the quasi-criminal nature of civil forfeiture is discussed infra.
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VIII. The Quasi-CriminalCharacterof Forfeiture
The Montana analysis of tribal jurisdiction in a forfeiture proceeding and
federal court decisions regarding analogous extensions of tribal sovereignty,
both lead to the conclusion that Indian tribes legally can enact and can enforce
civil forfeiture provisions. This may not be enough. The fear animating the
Court's decision in Oliphant was that allowing tribal courts to punish non-

Indians would result in "unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty" in
contravention of basic principles of American justice, like the Bill of
Rights.2 According to Judge William C. Canby, "One of the undercurrents
in Oliphant is that the tribes cannot be trusted to dispense justice fairly." "

The use of in rem fictions to support a tribal court's jurisdiction in a forfeiture
proceeding raises the very concern that the Supreme Court articulated in
Oliphant- that allowing Indian tribes to "punish" non-Indians would deprive
the non-Indians of basic liberties.
The fundamental skepticism of the federal courts - the belief that "nonIndians will receive less than impartial justice from tribal courts"' - may
cause some federal courts to reject the clear policies of Congress and the
Executive branch favoring Indian self-government and self-determination.m "

242. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) ("By submitting to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian Tribes therefore necessarily give up their
power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to
Congress.").
243. William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH.
L. REv. 1, 11 n.29 (1987). Concern over unfair treatment is not unidirectional. Indians fear that
they will not receive fair treatment in state and federal courts. Their concern is backed by a
history of poor treatment. Samuel J. Brakel writes that :
The notion that there are such things as "Indian justice" and "white justice" is
too simple and too general to be meaningful. This dichotomy implies a number of
equally invalid subdichotomies. Some of the main contrasts are the following:
Indian justice is to white justice as
impartiality is to prejudice
humanism is to legalism
mediation is to adjudication
SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE CosTs OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 92
(1978).
244. Superior Oil Co. v. Merritt, 619 F. Supp. 526, 534 (D. Utah 1985).
245. From the early 1960s to the present, self-determination has been the hallmark of federal
Indian policy. Both the executive branch and the legislative branch encourage tribal selfdetermination and self-government. Compare, e.g., Message from the Presidentof the United
States TransmittingRecommendationsforIndian Policy,H.R. Doc. No. 363,91 st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970) (President Nixon's message to Congress urging a policy of self-determination without
termination); Memorandum on Government-to-Govemment Relationship with Native American
Tribal Governments, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 936 (Apr. 28, 1994) (President Clinton's
statement reaffirming that there is a government-to-government relationship between the tribes
and the United States) with Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25
U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n (1994); Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project Act of 1991, Pub.
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The courts may proclaim that civil forfeiture provisions, an institution of
modern American law enforcement, are "inconsistent" with Indian tribes'
status as domestic dependent nations. This is the last stopgap of a judiciary
that is reluctant to implement congressional policy that fosters Indian
sovereignty.
A. Federal CourtReview of Indians' Assertions of Civil Jurisdictionover
Non-Indians
In National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,' a tribal
court entered a default judgment against a non-Indian insurance company
from an accident occurring on the reservation. The insurance company sought
relief in federal court, claiming that the tribe lacked power to enter a civil
judgment against the non-Indian company. The Supreme Court held that the
insurance company's challenge to the tribe's jurisdiction arose under federal
law and that the district court had jurisdiction to hear their argument under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.7 The Court stated: "The question whether an Indian tribe
retains the power to compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil
jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered by reference to
federal law and is a 'federal question' under § 1331."" The Court held that
limitations on tribal jurisdiction are a matter of federal law. An analysis of
these limitations requires a careful examination of tribal sovereignty and the
extent to which it has been altered, divested, or diminished by treaty, statute,
executive branch policy, or through judicial decisions as a result of the tribe's
status as a domestic dependent nation." 9
Tribal forfeiture provisions affect property and require the tribal court to
assert jurisdiction over property, not people. Federal review, therefore, will
not include a substantive review of the tribal legislation under the ICRA"
The review is limited to habeas corpus petitions for tribal actions which
violate the ICRA. Tribal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over non-habeas
corpus actions brought to enforce the ICRA.Y Congress limited federal
Court review of forfeiture actions to a determination of whether the tribal

L. No. 102-84, 105 Stat. 1278 (amending provisions of 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n). Congress is
cognizant of this policy in the legislation it enacts today. Congress acts carefully to ensure that

legislation does not "encroach upon or diminish in any way the inherent sovereign authority of
each tribal government. . . ." 25 U.S.C. § 3631 (1994).
246. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (providing that a federal district court "shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States").
248. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 852 (footnote omitted).
249. Id.at 854-57.
250. See supra notes 85-94.
251. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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court has jurisdiction over the propertyY' If the federal court concludes that
the tribal court jurisdiction is proper, then the inquiry ends. The federal court
does not inquire whether the tribal court correctly applied tribal law or federal
law. "Deprived of the ICRA as a tool, federal judges might understandably
turn to the 'inconsistent with their status' test of Oliphant. . . . When the
plaintiff is [non-Indian], the complaint against tribal authority can often be
rephrased out of ICRA terms which attack the exercise of tribal power and
turned into an attack on the very existence of tribal power over the nonIndian."' This is the last judicial "check" on Indian sovereignty available
to skeptical federal judges.
Ultimately, the propriety of tribal forfeiture laws may collapse into two
related analyses consisting of a mixture of law and policy. The first question
is whether civil forfeiture laws are so essentially "criminal" in nature that a
tribe's exercise of jurisdiction in a forfeiture would violate Oliphant because
it is inconsistent with Indian tribes' status as domestic dependent nations? The
second question is whether the Supreme Court is so suspicious of tribal justice
systems that it might find that "civil" forfeiture, for purposes of a
constitutional analysis, is irrelevant when an Indian tribe is the sovereign? If
the answer to either of these questions is "yes," then the Court would strike
down tribal forfeiture laws. The following subsections discuss why the answer
to both of these questions should be "no."
1. United States v. Ursery: Civil ForfeituresAre "Civil" Proceedings
Although forfeiture proceedings are civil proceedings, the question remains
whether tribes can enact and enforce in rem forfeiture procedures because
forfeitures are quasi-criminal in character. The Supreme Court went a long
way toward answering this question in a recent case. In United States v.
Ursery,' the Court held that the in rem civil forfeitures at issue in that case
and civil forfeitures generally are neither "punishment" nor "criminal" for the
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.' s
In Ursery, the Supreme Court consolidated one case from the Sixth Circuit
and one case from the Ninth Circuit, in which the lower courts held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the Government from both (1) punishing a
defendant for a criminal offense and (2) forfeiting his property for that same
offense in a separate civil proceeding pursuant to federal forfeiture laws.'
The lower courts based their decision, in part, upon their conclusion that the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in United States v. Halper9 and Austin v.

252. NationalFarmers Union, 471 U.S. at 844 (footnote omitted).
253. Robert Laurence, Martinez, Oliphant and Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 CAMPBEU.L. REV. 411, 421-22 (1988).
254. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
255. Id. at 2149.
256. Id. at 2142-43.
257. 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that a civil penalty "may be so extreme and so divorced
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United States"' indicated that civil forfeitures were categorically "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Relying on these cases,
the lower courts held that it was unconstitutional for the government to both
pursue criminal proceedings against the defendants and to institute civil
forfeiture proceedings against property seized from or titled to the defendants
because such action would constitute two punishments.
In Ursery, the Supreme Court rejected the lower court's interpretations
of Halper and Austin. First, the Court noted that it had already considered
the relationship between in rem forfeiture and the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 9 the government
sought in rem forfeiture of a distillery, warehouse, and denaturing plant
because the corporation had sought to defraud the government of tax on
distilled spirits. To determine the nature of a civil forfeiture, the Court
referred to the label affixed by the legislature and stated that "[t]he
2
forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense.""
Thus,
the Court held that the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause did not
apply 6.
In Ursery, the Court described the relevance of Various Items as follows:
"In reaching its conclusion [in Various Items], the Court drew a sharp
distinction between in rem civil forfeitures and in personam civil penalties
such as fines: though the latter could, in some circumstances, be punitive,
the former could not."''
This presumption is the general rule that
pervades the Court's assessment of in rem forfeitures: in rem forfeitures are
not criminal and they are not punishment.
The Court next noted that two cases of more recent vintage, One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United Statesa and United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,2' had affirmed the rule of Various Items. In
EmeraldCut Stones, the Court stated that, in the context of forfeiture, "[t]he
question of whether a given sanction is civil or criminal is one of statutory
construction."'
In 89 Firearms, the Court refined this statement and
adopted a two stage analysis. First, the Court determines whether Congress

from the Government's damages and expenses as to constitute punishment").
258. 49D U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
is not limited solely to criminal proceedings and finding that the forfeiture at issue constituted
a payment to the sovereign as punishment for an offense and was therefore subject the limitations
of the Excessive Fines Clause).
259. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
260. Id. at 581.
261. Id.
262. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2141 (citing Various Items, 282 U.S. at 581).
263. 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
264. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
265. Enwrald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 237.
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intended the proceedings to be "criminal" or "civil."" Second, the Court
considers "whether the proceedings are so punitive in fact as to 'persuade
us that the forfeiture proceeding[s] may not legitimately be viewed as civil
in nature,' despite Congress' intent." 7 Essentially, the Supreme Court
will accept a legislature's intention to establish a civil remedy unless the
Court finds "the clearest proof' that the only rational purpose and effect of
the forfeiture is punitive.' In Ursery, the Supreme Court applied the 89
Firearmsanalysis and concluded that the in rem forfeitures at issue were
not "criminal" and did not constitute punishment because Congress intended
that they be civil and because the provisions were not "so punitive in form
and effect as to render them criminal despite Congress' intent to the
contrary."'
Applying the 89 Firearmsanalysis to tribal forfeiture provisions leads to
the inescapable conclusion that tribal forfeitures are "civil" proceedings that
are within the scope of powers that Indians may exercise over non-Indians.
First, because tribal forfeitures would have to be civil proceedings to
comport with Oliphant, any tribal legislation should include a clear
statement of legislative intent. A clear statement of legislative intent would
satisfy the first stage of the 89 Firearms analysis. Second, in rem
forfeitures are not solely punitive. In Ursery, the Supreme Court recognized
that in rem forfeitures serve a variety of non-punitive purposes.
Forfeitures serve a variety of purposes, but are designed
primarily to confiscate property used in violation of the law, and
to require disgorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct. Though
it may be possible to quantify the value of the property forfeited, it is virtually impossible to quantify, even approximate,
the nonpunitive purposes served by a particular civil forfeiture.27
Tribal forfeiture, therefore, would satisfy the second stage of the 89
Firearmsanalysis.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ursery should end the inquiry into the
"quasi-criminal" nature of tribal forfeiture proceedings. Ursery makes clear
that in rem tribal forfeiture proceedings that are modelled after federal
forfeiture proceedings are not criminal and they are not punishment. The
only limit on Ursery's applicability to consideration of tribal forfeiture
proceedings is that Ursery assessed in rem forfeiture proceedings under the
Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court's

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147 (quoting 89 Firearms,465 U.S. at 366).
89 Firearms,465 U.S. at 363.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2137-38.
Id. at 2145.
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reasoning in Ursery is, however, uniquely relevant to federal Indian law by
the very fact that it is grounded in the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court's
discussion of the civil/criminal dichotomy in Indian law is remarkably
similar to the Court's Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence.
The Double Jeopardy Clause "serves the function of preventing both
successive punishments and ... successive prosecutions. The protection
against multiple punishments prohibits the Government from punishing
twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same
offense.""' This parallels the limits that the Supreme Court has placed on
Indian Sovereignty.
The power of the United States to try and criminally punish is
an important manifestation of the power to restrict personal
liberty. By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the
United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their
power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in
a manner acceptable to Congress.'
Ursery makes clear that tribal in rem forfeiture is neither an attempt to "try"
a non-Indian nor an attempt to "criminally punish" a non-Indian.
2. Austin v. United States: Civil ForfeituresAre "Remedial"
The fact that a proceeding is "civil" does not insulate it from
constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court's decision in Austin v. United
States" leaves open the possibility that federal courts could evaluate tribal
forfeiture provisions to determine whether they are "remedial" or "punitive."
Austin involved a challenge to the forfeiture of an instrumentality as an
excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. Austin pleaded guilty to
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Soon thereafter, the United
States filed an in rem action seeking to forfeit Austin's mobile home and
auto body shop under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). 7 Austin argued
that the proceeding violated the Eighth Amendment proscription against
excessive fines.
The Court stated that the determinative question in its analysis is whether
the forfeiture amounted to a punishment." The civil or criminal nature of
a civil in rem forfeiture did not determine whether the Eighth Amendment

271. Id. at 2139-40 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
272. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (emphases added).
273. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
274. Id. at 604. These statutes provide for the forfeiture of conveyances and real property
that is connected with the violations of the laws regarding "controlled substances, their raw
materials, and equipment used in their manufacture and distribution." Id. at 605 n.l.
275. Id. at 622.
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applied."' The court did state a general reliance on the civil/criminal
dichotomy in applying constitutional protections to civil forfeiture
proceedings. The fact that the text of the Eighth Amendment did not
expressly limit itself to criminal cases distinguished it from other provisions
in the Bill of Rights.2" Had the founders specifically limited the Eighth
Amendment's application to criminal cases, as they limited the Fifth
Amendment's proscription against self-incrimination, the Court would not
have undertaken ' an analysis of whether the forfeiture constituted an
"excessive fine." But because the Eighth Amendment's protections are
not, by its terms, limited to criminal proceedings, the Court considered
whether forfeiture was a monetary "punishment."
The Court found that both forfeiture in general and statutory in rem
forfeiture in particular were considered, at least in part, as punishment at the
time the founders ratified the Eighth Amendment."' The Court then
extended its analysis to the statutory provisions at issue, but found
"nothing in these provisions or their legislative history to contradict the
historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment."' t The fact that the
statutes also served some remedial purpose did not change the Court's
analysis. Only if the civil sanction were solely remedial - if it served no
retributive or deterrent purposes - would it not be subject to the limitations
of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.uZ
The Supreme Court's opinion in Austin means that some forfeiture
provisions are considered punishment for purposes of constitutional analysis.
Presumably, the analysis of the "nature" of tribal forfeiture provisions will
dovetail with the constitutional "punishment" analysis to some extent. As
indicated previously, the two stage analysis developed in 89 Firearmsand
applied in Ursery should resolve the issue of the propriety of tribal
forfeiture in favor of Indian jurisdiction. 3 If, however, federal courts
reject the Supreme Court's broad mandate in Ursery, then they may fall
back on Austin's remedial/punitive analysis. The question then is what tribal
forfeiture provisions will be wholly remedial.
In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,' the Supreme Court
clarified that forfeiture of contraband is entirely remedial and is a "civil

276. Id. at 607-10.

277. Id. at 607-08 & n.4.
278. If the Court found the civil forfeiture proceedings to be so punitive that it must be
considered criminal, then the Court would analyze the forfeiture. Id. (citing Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)).

279. Id. at 618.
280. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4), (a)(7) (1994).
281. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
282. Id. at 622.

283. See supra part VIII.A.I.
284. 409 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1972).
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sanction." The Court stated that forfeiture of contraband and payment of
a fixed sum

prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United
States, and, by its monetary penalty, it provides a reasonable

form of liquidated damages for violation of the inspection
provisions and serves to reimburse the Government for inves-

tigation and enforcement expenses. In other contexts we have
recognized that such purposes characterize remedial rather than
punitive sanctions.'

Thus, it is clear that tribes may forfeit contraband and impose a fixed sum
penalty for its possession.
Forfeiture of proceeds of a crime is also remedial and is a "civil"
sanction. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and D.C. Circuits
have held that forfeiture of proceeds of a crime is remedial because it
involves property that the claimant did not lawfully earn or own and
property in which the claimant has no reasonable expectation of continued
possession.' These opinions rely on the Fifth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Tilley,' that interpreted Austin and distinguished forfeiture of

instrumentalities, which are not necessarily proportional to the harm
inflicted upon the government and society, and forfeiture of proceeds.
Proceeds are, by their very nature, directly proportional to the "value" of (or
injury inflicted by, as the case may be) the illegal act." The Supreme
Court appears to agree with this view.'
Forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime is more problematic and will
require carefully drawn statutes. Tribal governments should base the
forfeiture provisions on specific findings related to non-punitive reasons that
necessitate them. Five legitimate, non-punitive reasons are: (1) to protect

285. Id. at 237.
286. See Sr.with v. United States, 76 F.3d 879, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
$184,505.01 in United States Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1168-69 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3669 (Mar. 28, 1996) (No. 95-1575); United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 554 (6th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Wild, 47 F.3d 669, 674 n.11 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Alexander, '12F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994); SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir.
1994); United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 573 (1994).
But see United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that any civil forfeiture is punishment), rev'd sub nor. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996), and United States v. 9844 S.Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Fifth
Circuitfs reasoning in Tilley and adopting the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in $405,089.23).
287. 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994).
288. Id. at 300.
289. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2148-49 (reversing lower court's determination that all civil
forfeitures aie punishment and stating that "[t]o the extent that [forfeiturel applies to 'proceeds'
of illegal drug activity, it serves the additional nonpunitive goal of ensuring that persons do not
profit from their illegal acts").
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the character of the land; (2) to abate a nuisance;2" (3) to encourage
property owners to take measures to prevent their property from being used
to commit or facilitate crime; (4) to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the residents of the reservation; and (5) to provide remedy to
injured party - for example, to reimburse the tribal government for the
costs of law enforcement, detection, investigation, and prosecution of
violations of the law, and for the costs of maintaining the reservation.

3. Federal Court Review of Tribal Forfeiture
Tribal courts are not subject to the United States Constitution, except as
they are expressly made so by the Constitution (i.e., the Commerce Clause)
or an act of Congress.292 Tribal forfeiture actions would be subject to the
ICRA, but tribal courts would apply the act, and federal courts would not
have the power to effect a substantive review of the proceeding. "That
means that tribal courts are the sole arbiters of their own governmental
'
actions when 'mere' property rights of non-Indians are involved."293
Federal court review would consist solely of a review of tribal jurisdiction.
This limitation on the power of federal courts may tempt the courts to cite
Austin and find that tribal forfeiture is "inconsistent" with Indian tribes'
status. Because forfeiture is quasi-criminal, federal courts could find that
civil forfeiture proceedings are "criminal" for Indian law, but "civil" for
"Anglo-American" law.
Any such decision by a federal court would treat Indians as less than full
citizens, and would be evidence that the federal courts' concern with
"protecting" citizens from inadequacies of tribal courts is limited to

protecting non-Indian citizens. In Martinez v. SantA Clara Pueblo,2' the
Supreme Court restricted the jurisdiction of federal courts reviewing alleged
ICRA violations to habeas corpus cases. The Court chose to affirm tribal
sovereignty in Santa Clara Pueblo even when the affirmation "ha[d] the
effect of denying American citizens [in this case Indians] the equal
protection of the laws."29s The Court, "realizing that the ICRA incor-

290. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 2148 (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (forfeiture
of car designed to abate a nuisance - namely, prostitution - thus it was remedial) and United
States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990) (forfeiting apartment building used to
sell crack cocaine)).
291. Id.

292. Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131,
135 (10th Cir. 1959).
293. Bowen, supra note 87, at 651; COHEN 1982 ED., supra note 87, at 668 (stating that
federal court review under the Indian Civil Rights Act is limited to entertaining petitions for writs
of habeas corpus)).
294. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
295. Christina D. Ferguson, Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modem Day Lesson On

Tribal Sovereignty, 46 ARK. L. REv. 275, 299 (1993).
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porated two distinct and often competing congressional purposes of
protecting individual Indians from unjust actions of tribal government and
promoting Indian self-government, decided that the latter must prevail."' "
Federal courts should follow the Supreme Court's lead in Santa Clara
Pueblo and uphold tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians in forfeiture
proceedings. Failure to do so would offer greater protection to non-Indians
than to [ndians. It also would countermand the choice that the Supreme
Court made in Santa Clara Pueblo and congressional policy as expressed
in the Indian Tribal Justice Act.
B. The ICRA and Due Process Concerns
The Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes, but the ICRA does.'
Congress has ensured that many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights will
apply to proceedings in tribal courts, even if they are not reviewable by
federal courts, through the enactment of the ICRA.
Austin raises the
possibility that some protections of the ICRA may apply to tribal forfeiture
proceedings.
In property disputes, the tribal court applies the ICRA. The language of the
provisions in the ICRA does not mirror exactly the language of the Bill of
Rights and the Act is not conterminous with the Bill of Rights.' The
ICRA, therefore, applies to tribal courts differently than the Bill of Rights
applies to the states and the federal government.' The provisions of the
ICRA may apply less restrictively than similarly worded provisions of the
Constitution. This result would be consistent with the federal government's
concurrent policies of encouraging the development of tribal courts and
allowing the tribes to determine what self-government means to them.
Courts must recognize an Indian tribe's heritage and customs and its
method of self-government when analyzing the tribe's actions under the
ICRA. 1 As well as drawing on their unique tribal values in their legislative

296. KICKINGBIRD ET AL, supra note 158, at 11.
297. Oliphant v. United States, 435 U.S. 191, 194 n.3 (1978) (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163

U.S. 376 (1896)).
298. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
299. Oliplhnt, 435 U.S. at 194; Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619 (D.C.N.D. 1973);
GETCHES E1 AL., supra note 103, at 501.
300. See Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 620 (1973); see also Crowe v. Eastern Band of
Cherokees, 506 F.2d 1231, 1236 (4th Cir. 1974) ("[Ihe object of the Indian Civil Rights Act was
to protect the individual members from arbitrary tribal Action, but it was not intended that
historic sovereignty of a tribe should be abolished.").
301. Santa Clara v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (stating that a court must consider the
laws, customs, and values of the tribe when interpreting the ICRA and that the interpretation is
to be made in a tribal justice forum); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1011, 1105 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976)
("[Tihe courts have been careful to construe the terms 'due process' and 'equal protection' as used
in the Indian Bill of Rights with due regard for the historical, governmental, and cultural values
of an Indian tribe.").
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and judicial judgments, the law developed in tribal legislatures and trial courts
may also differ from federal law, by virtue of hindsight Tribes may learn from
the mistakes of those who have gone before them. In this manner, tribes may
offer non-Indian justice systems a chance to learn from the choices the tribal
justice systems make.'
This different and presumably deferential analysis of Bill of Rights-like
ICRA provisions may raise a new set of problems, such as what constitutes due
process under the ICRA? Does the analysis of tribal actions begin with or even
include the historical "American legal history,"3 or does it consist solely of
tribal notions of due process? Are there minimum requirements that any
"sovereign" must meet?
In response to the last question, there is arguably a long-established "rule"
requiring independentjudicialreview that might limit tribal forfeiture. In Tumey
v. Ohio,' the Supreme Court held that a denial of due process occurred when
the state of Ohio required a criminal defendant to appear before "a court the
judge of which ha[d] a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in
reaching a conclusion against him in his case."'3"
Tumey was arrested and charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating
liquor. The State's Prohibition Act provided for trial by mayor of the village.
The Village's ordinances provided that fines would be assessed in the event of
conviction, and that the Mayor would receive a portion of these fines "as his
fees and costs, in addition to his regular salary."' The Supreme Court held
that this system denied the defendant due process of law.
The federal forfeiture system provides that property is forfeited to the
government. One might argue that a judge sitting in a forfeiture case has a
pecuniary interest in the matter. It has been held, however, that forfeiture
proceedings in the abstract do not violate due process?'

302. Edward Halbach, Jr., member of the steering committee of the American Indian Lawyer
Training Program's Tribal Justice Center Project, testified at Investigative Hearings on the
Administration of Justice in Indian Country:
It's a rather unique opportunity at this date in history to write on a relatively clean
slate and yet to be able to study the experience of others-to examine the
surrounding state and federal legal systems and their experience, their inadequacies, even some successes, and try to take the best and leave what did not

work.
JUSTICE ININDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 9, at 127.
303. One possibility is that historical English and American legal standards may apply in
forfeiture cases because the tribe is in effect adopting an Anglo-American institution. See White
Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
304. 273 U.S. 510 (1926).
305. Id. at 523.
306. Id. at 522. The total amount of fines collected by the village court during a seven
month period for violation of the prohibition law was "upwards of $20,000" and the Mayor
received $1796.50. Id. at 522-23.
307. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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Although forfeiture does not violate due process, tribal forfeiture may face
a different challenge. Many tribes do not have a constitutional provision
mandating separation of powers," and tribal judges acknowledge that the
absence of a separation of powers hurts the reputation of their courts."
Federal courts may believe that tribal courts are not sufficiently independent and
distinguishable from tribal police and the tribal legislature. This may lead the
federal courts to the finding that forfeiture is inconsistent with Indian tribes'
status. Implicit in Tumey is the notion that a tripartite system of government
requires that a judge may not be a part of the executive branch that reaps the
benefits of forfeiture."' This is an important concern in forfeiture actions
where the tribe, its members, and the tribal court may stand to gain directly a
great deal from the forfeiture. Tribal forfeiture is only appropriate in those tribes
that have adopted procedures to guarantee a separation of powers. Modelling
tribal forfeiture after federal forfeiture insures that tribal judges are impartial in
the same manner that federal judges are impartial in forfeiture actions.
C. Are the Federal Courts Too Skeptical or Too Prejudiced?
The Supreme Court considers private property rights to be extremely
important and the Court's recent decisions - Austin, for example - have
attempted to rein in the federal government's use of forfeiture law."' Austin
may signal a retreat from the extensive use of the legal fictions underlying in
rem forfeiture law. Austin may also harken a shift in conventional wisdom that
state forfeiture laws and tribal forfeiture laws will be treated the same as federal
forfeiture laws. In addition, while the Court has shown little sympathy for the
rights of accused criminals, the Court may give less deference to a tribal
accusation. The politics of the Supreme Court may mean that the prospects are

308. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, 1984 REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 1,at 29 (1984) ("[T]he failure
to establish a clear separation of powers between the tribal council and the tribal judiciary has
resulted in political interference with tribal courts weakening their independence, and raising
doubts about fairness and the role of law."), quoted in Bradley B. Furber, Two Promises, Tvo

Propositions:The Wheeler-HowardAct as a Reconciliation of the Indian Law Civil War, 14 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 211, 213 n.9 (1991); SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL
COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 9 (1978).
309. JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 9, at 127 (testimony at Investigative Hearings
on the Administration of Justice in Indian Country). Carol Redcherries, Chief Judge of the
Northern Cheyenne Judicial System, acknowledged that when a tribal council has the power to
overrule th"tribal judges, this pressure may affect the judge's decision. Id.
310. Congress has not seen fit to legislate separation of powers as a general prerequisite to
expanded roles for tribal courts. See H.R No. 205, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2425, 2436 ("The Committee intends this section to provide clear direction
to the Administration that this Act shall not serve as authority to impose standards upon any tribal
justice system. Nor does the Committee intend this legislation to serve as a mandate for
separation of powers for any tribal government.").
311. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S.
544 (1993).
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dim of establishing forfeiture as a viable and effective method of law enforcement.
The politics of the Court may also be bolstered by legitimate concerns
regarding the capacity of Indian tribes to administer forfeiture programs fairly,
and concerns regarding the capacity of the Indian tribes to muster the resources
to administer forfeiture programs at all. The fear that the Court expressed in
Oliphant was not about the design of tribal criminal laws, so the fact that they
would be modeled after federal laws might not satisfy the Court. The Court was
concerned about the administration of tribal justice. As Judge Canby notes, the
image was of a partisan and primitive system ofjustice. The Court suspects that
tribal courts may discriminate against outsiders.
The present Supreme Court might share such doubts about tribal courts
administering civil forfeiture laws. Any such judicial skepticism should not
override reality and congressional policy. For instance, "a recent study by the
American Indian Policy Review Commission emphasizes the fact that tribal
justice systems are evolving institutions, becoming more and more sophisticated
and are potentially capable of assuming total jurisdiction in Indian country. The
study concluded that tribal court systems are as capable as non-Indian judicial
systems in administering justice in Indian country." 2 In addition, Congress has
acted to supply Indian tribes with the resources to develop tribal justice systems.
The Indian Tribal Justice System Act authorizes more than $58 million per year
for the years of 1994 through 2000?"
Conclusion
Congress encourages the development of tribal justice systems, and the
Supreme Court has evidenced a willingness to allow tribal courts to prove
themselves, under the watchful eye of the federal courts. Although Congress has
extended the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts to offenses committed by
and against non-Indians, "there is no comparable legislation granting the federal
courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians that arise
on an Indian reservation."314 In rem forfeitures are civil proceedings that offer
tribes a practical and effective method of law enforcement. Tribes should enact
and enforce civil forfeiture provisions on their reservations against both Indians
and non-Indians.
Tribal court decisions are subject to review by the federal courts, but tribal
courts have the first chance to determine the extent of their jurisdiction 5 The
Supreme Court recognizes that the issue of jurisdiction is open to debate and the
congressional policy of encouraging self-government and self-determination

312. KICKINGBIRD ET AL., supra note 158, at 25 (footnote omitted).
313. 25 U.S.C. § 3621 (1994).
314. National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 854
(1985) (citing CoHEN 1982 ED., supra note 87, at 253).
315. Id. at 856.
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supports a requirement that a party seeking relief in federal court first must
exhaust tribal court remedies. 6
The enactment and enforcement of forfeiture provisions is a perfect
opportunity for tribes to begin to expand the role of tribal legislatures and tribal
courts. Forfeiture is a practical and effective method of law enforcement. It
would fill a void in police powers, replenish the tribes' coffers, limit illegal
activity, and it should satisfy the non-Indian courts' concerns because the
forfeiture provisions and judicial scrutiny of them could be modelled after
federal law. Tribal forfeiture merely replicates procedures used extensively by
the federal government.
One commentator has written:
The decision in National Farmers Union places a tremendous
responsibility upon, and presents a tremendous opportunity for,
tribal courts and those who litigate disputes before these vital
institutions of Indian self-government. Through the tools of the
adversary process, relevant statutes, treaties, Executive Branch
policy, and judicial decisions must be presented to tribal court as
they decide in the first instance what tribal sovereignty means for
their particular tribe's self-governing vision. The adequacy and
thoroughness of the relevant record and judicial reasoning upon that
record at the tribal court level will likely -have a determinative
impact on a non-Indian federal court's review of the initial tribal
decision. Thus, Indian tribal courts have been presented with a
unique wedge to drive home an Indian vision of tribal sovereignty
in United States society. If affirmed by federal courts, the vision
and discourse of sovereignty articulated in the tribal court opinion
will have the force of law in United States society. Of course, there
is no guarantee that this vision articulated by tribal courts will
always be affirmed." 7
Forfeiture provisions offer a unique opportunity for Indian tribes to expand the
Indian vision of tribal sovereignty by adopting the legal fictions that support an
Anglo-American Institution for their own purposes.
Indian tribes should take advantage of this opportunity in a deliberate manner
by enacting and enforcing in rem forfeiture legislation. A tribe considering such
legislation should do all that it can to ensure that it heads off any challenges to
its exercise of jurisdiction and proceeds accordingly. The following actions
should prove helpful in ensuring that federal courts, who inevitably will be

316. id. at 856-57.
317. Robert A. Williams, The Discourses of Sovereignty in Indian Country, INDIAN LAW
SUPPORT CENTER REP., Sept. 1988, at 9 (vol. 11) (quoted in Frank R. Pommersheim, The
Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 362
(1989)).
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called upon to review a tribe's assertion of jurisdiction, will approve tribal court
jurisdiction over in rem forfeitures.
First, the tribal government should pass specific legislation authorizing in rem
forfeiture. This legislation should authorize explicitly denominated civil
proceedings, and should distinguish clearly this exercise of jurisdiction from an
exercise of criminal jurisdiction. The tribe also should limit the legislation to in
rem actions and should emphasize that it is an action against the property rather
than the person. The legislation also should be tied closely to control of
contraband rather than to criminal violations. The less the legislation smacks of
punishment by another name, the better. For example, the legislation should not
contain an "innocent owner" exception?" The tribe should require and should
enforce proper notice provisions. The legislation also should afford claimants
an opportunity to appeal the judgment of forfeiture to a tribal appellate court.
Furthermore, the tribe should hold hearings, should gather evidence, and
should articulate specific findings regarding the need for law enforcement of this
type. Where appropriate, the tribe should indicate that the legislation is
necessary to address conduct that "threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe."3"9 The tribe also should acknowledge that the legislation is considered
remedial action. For instance, the legislation might be necessary to preserve the
character of the reservation by preventing the introduction of contraband or by
abating a nuisance. Forfeiture proportional to the cost or value of illegal action
would compensate the tribe for its law enforcement expenses.
The enforcement of the legislation should begin conservatively. Entry on
reservation land should be monitored, and entry by non-Indians should be
limited to cases in which the non-Indian consents to the tribe's exercise of civil
jurisdiction over disputes arising on the reservation. The tribe should pursue
forfeiture for events occurring on the reservation, in "closed" areas, and on tribal
trust land. Initially, the tribe should establish jurisdiction over forfeiture of
contraband and proceeds. Only after establishing this solid foundation for the
exercise of jurisdiction should the tribe seek to forfeit instrumentalities.
Each tribe must decide on a vision of its own sovereignty. The development
of federal Indian law has limited the avenues available to actualize these visions.
In rem forfeiture is one avenue that is both appropriate and available for Indian
tribes to pursue a "civil," but still highly effective method of law enforcement.

318. Cf.Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931) (holding
that Double jeopardy Clause did not apply to in rem forfeiture provision that did not contain
"innocent owner" exemption) with Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619 (1993) (holding
that Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment applies to forfeiture of property pursuant to
statute containing "innocent owner" exemption and noting that "[tihese exemptions serve to focus
the provisions on the culpability of the owner in a way that makes them look more like
punishment, not less").
319. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
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